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JURISDICTION STATEMENT
Judgment o{ conviction in this matter was entered on the 3rd day of October,
1994. This appeal is taken from a final judgment pursuant to the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure and specifically pursuant to Rule 26 if'b)( 1) of said Rules.
ISSUES PRESENTED
L

Is the statute under which the appellant is charged, Utah Code Annotated, § 76-6505, 1,1953 as amended), unconstitutionally vague on its tace and as applied to the
facts of this case.

II.

Is fraudulent intern required as an element in tins type of crime for a crime to

exist?
IIL

Where, in a criminal proceeding where the State of Uiah is the party plaintiff rnay

criminal liability and punishments be predicated upon a third puny s unfetteied
discretion?
IV.

Does Utah Code- Annotated § 76-6-505 as drawn permit imprisonment for a debt

which is in contravention oi the provisions under Article L § 16 of the Utah
Constitution?
V.

Does Utah Code Annotated §76-6-505 as drawn shift the burden of persuasion

from Plaintiff to Defendant?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Appellant was originally charged by Information with Issuing Bad Checks, a
2nd Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-535 (1953 as amended"),
and Communications Fraud, a 3rd Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated

§ 76-10-1906 (1). Through negotiations between attorneys involved in this case, the
Appellant agreed to plead guilty to the amended charge of issuing Bad Checks, a 3rd
Degree Felony. The Communications Fraud was to be dismissed thirty days after
sentencing. Defendant was sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison for a term not
to exceed five years but the sentence was suspended and Appellant was placed on
probation. The remaining two counts were dismissed.
Pursuant to proceeding had on 11 August, 1994, the Defendant entered a plea of
guilty but preserved issues for appeal as presented in Pretrial Motions (T. page 2).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
1.

Appellant is charged with violation of certain provisions of the Utah Criminal
Law; laws winch are vague on their face and as they are applied to the facts of
tins case,,

2.

The vagueness of applicable Utah law allow a third party to decide, in their
unfettered discretion, winch offender may be held civilly liable and winch offender
may be held criminally liable. This third party discretion violates the Equal
Protection Law and the Due Process guaranteed to us all.

3.

Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-535, as drawn, permits imprisonment for a debt
which is in contravention of the provision under Article I, § 16 of the Utah
Constitution.

4.

Appellant was denied any defense based on lack of intent to defraud a
prerequisite to the maintenance of any criminal prosecution of this nature,
ARGUMENT

POINT L

The statute under which appellant is charged, Utah Code .Annotated, § 76-

6-535, ("1953 as amended), is unconstitutionally vague on its face.
The United States Supreme Court in Koiender v, Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 359 n. 8,
75L.Ed.2d 903, 910 n. 8, 103 S.Ct. 1855 (1983) observed:
In his dissent, Justice \Vhite claims the !,[t'|he upshot of our cases . . . is that
•whether or not a statute purports to regulate constitutionally protected conduct, it
shoyuld not be held unconstitutionally vague on its face, unless it is vague in all of
its possible applications." Post at 370, 75 L.Ed.2d at 917-918. The description of
our holdings is inaccurate in several respects. First, it neglects the fact that we
permit a facial challenge if a law reaches "a substantial amount of constitutionally
protected conduct." Hoffman Estates v. Flippside, Hoffman Estates, Lie,, 455
U.S. 489, 494, 71 L.Ed.2d 362, 102 S.Ct 1186 (1902). Second, where a statute
imposes criminal penalties, the standard of certainty is higher. See, Winters v.
New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515 92 L.Ed. 840, 68 S.CL 665^1948). This concern
has, at times, led us to invalidate a criminal statute on its face even when it could
conceivably have had some valid application. See, e.g. Coiauiii v. Franklin, 439
U.S. 379, 394-401, 58 L.Ed.2d 556, 99 S.Ct. 675 \ 1979); Lanzelta v. New Jersey,
300 U.S. 451, 85 L E d . 888, 59 S.Ct. 618 U939').
The United States Supreme 'Court stated the void-for-vagueness doctrine in
Koiender, Id. at 357-358 as follows:
As generally stated, the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute
define the criminal oflense with stiffieient definiteness that ordinary people can
understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage
arbitrary enforcement, we have recognized recently that the more important
aspect of the vagueness doctrine "is not actual notice, but the other principal
element of the doctrine— the requirement that a legislature establish minimal
guidelines to govern law enforcement." Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. at 574,
39 L.Ed.2d 605, 94 S.Ct. 1242. Where the legislature fails to provide such
minimal guidelines, a criminal statue may permit "a standardless sweep [that]
allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their own personal
predilections.11 id. at 575, 39 L.Ed.2d 605, 94 S.CL 1242.
A statute similar to Utah Code Annotated, §76-6-535, (1953 as amended) was
declared unconstitutionally vague on its face by the Colorado Supreme Court in People
v. Vinnola, 177 Colo. 405, 494 F.2d 826 i*Colo. 1972) at 830, the Court observed:
3

We hold the definition of "insufficient funds" in Section 40-14-20 (l)(h) is vague,
ambiguous, and unintelligible. That section defines insufficient funds to mean
"that the drawer has no legal right to require the drawee to pay the check in
accordance with the ordinary course of the banking business." An interesting
contrast to this definition is that contained in the amended version of the vetoed
1969 HJ3. 10S7 which defined "insufficient funds" as follows:
"A drawer lias insufficient funds with a drawee to cover a check when he has no
funds or account whatsoever, or funds in an amount less than that of the check;
.and a check dishonored for ''no account" shall also be deemed to have been
dishonored for "insufficient funds".
The above quoted definition spelled out an understandable meaning of
"insufficient funds" while the 1970 Act leaves the meaning to surmise and
conjecture. Criminal liability cannot be predicated on such a standard. \Vhat is
meant by "legal right?" Does it refer to legal rights as determined by the
provisions of Article 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code, CR.S. 1963, 155-4-101
et seq?; or does it mean contractual rights between the drawer and the drawee;
or, does it refer to legal rights created by the provisions of the criminal law?
Also, where does one look to determine what accords with "the ordinary course of
banking business?" Is it to the Uniform Commercial Code, to some other statute,
or to the customs and practices of the banking business itself? Tins failure of
definition to clearly delineate an understandable meaning to the term "insufficient
funds," renders this portion of the statute invalid as being vague, indefinite,
ambiguous, and unintelligible.
Next, we find that the lack of any requirement in Section 40-14-20' that there bean intent to defraud coupled with a presumption of guilt provided in Subdivision
(5)(a)('i) would, under certain circumstances, render Section 40-14-20 to be no
more than a device to force payment of a debt. It is quite more than a device to
force payment of a debt. It is quite conceivable that a person could issue a check
without "knowing or having reasonable cause to know" that it will not be paid
when presented as required in Subdivision (2)(b). Thereafter, if the check is for
some reason not paid when presented, and if the maker is unable to redeem his
check within fifteen days (see Subdivision (6)(b), a presiunption arises winch shifts
the burden on the defendant to disprove his guilt. Such a result strikes at the
very foundation of our system of criminal justice as was recognized by this Court
in Moore v. People, supra. It is elementary that the burden of proving every
element of a criminal charge is upon the prosecution. Under Section 40-14-20,
the People need only to introduce the check, shew it was not paid, and rest. The
defendant is then placed in a position of being required to prove his innocence in
order to avoid imprisonment not for a criminal act, but for debt. Tliis is because
without fraudulent intent as an element in this type of offense, there can be no
crime. In this respect, Section 4014-20 can be inteipreted as notiiing more than a
4

collection statute which authorizes imprisonment for debt. As such, it is in
contravention of Colo. Const. Art. II, 12.
See also, Burnam v. Commonwealth. 228 Ky. 410, 15 S.W.2d 255, which uses the
following language to describe a statute winch was, in some respects, similar in
content to Section 40-14-20: The act ... is a debt collecting law. To that end, it
undertakes to invoke criminal processes and to inflict penalties which in their
severity may be on occasion disproportionate to the seriousness of the offense
endeavored to be created and the evil sought to be cured. The essential and
controlling difference between the act and other statutes of this kind ... is that the
element of feud and other criminal purpose is not an ingredient."
The Appellant is charged by Information in this case for violating the provisions
of Utah Code Annotated, § 76-6-505, (1953 as amended) which provides:
(1)
Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for the payment of
money, for the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or
corporation, any money, property, or other thing of value or paying for any
service, wages, salary, labor, or rent, knowing it will not be paid by the drawee
and payment is refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad check or draft
For the purpose of this subsection, a person who issues a check or draft for which
payment is refused by the drawee is presumed to know the check or draft would
not be paid if he had no account with the drawee at the time of issue.
(2)
Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for the payment of
money, for the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or
corporation, any1 money, properly, or other thing of value or paying for any
services, wages, salary, labor, or rent, payment of which check or draft is legally
refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad check or draft if lie fails to make
good and actual payment to payee in the amount of the refused check or draft
within 14 days of Ins receiving actual notice of the check or draffs; nonpayment.
Defendant contends that the provisions of §76-6-505 (supra) lack any clear
definite standards to determine guilt under the statute or guidelines as required to
govern law enforcement

Section 76-6-535 tails to give any clear definition to the term

"payment of which check or draft is legally refused by the drawee". "Legally refused" is a
legal term of art, subject to various interpretations and the question must then arise;

5

does it refer to legal rights as determined under the provisions of the Uniform
Commercial Code; does it mean contractual rights uetwem -n.
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person could issue a check without ,!knowing or having reasonable cause to knew" thai it
will not be paid when presented as required under Subsection i, 1). See, People v.
Vinnola, supra, cf State v. Delmotte, 665 P.2d 1314, (Utah 1983). Assume the case
where Defendant made a deposit via the night depository but the deposit was, for
whatever reason; not attributable to Defendant's conduct, never recieved by the bank.
Does the bank have any legal obligation to pay? Does the bank have any legal
obligation to pay within ten days in order to absolve Defendant of criminal conduct?
Does civil resolution of the competing claims not depend on factual nuances of the civil
law? Can the payee* in the mean time, insist on payment of a check wiiieh was
consequently dishonored at the banks discretion
The Nebraska Supreme Co ml held thai the eliniinutiuii of criminal intent as
element oi piouf necessary to establish violation of statute may violate Due riocess
when the penalty foj violation of the statute is t-eveje oi conviction pursuant to said
statute may irreparably damage the Defendant's reputation State v. Pettit, 445 N.W.2d
890 (Neb. 1989). The disabilities occasioned by a felony conviction might well satisfy
that standard
Defendant submits that the provisions of §76-6-505 (supra) should not be
construed to be a strict liability statute because the statute does not clearly indicate a
legislative purpose to impose criminal responsibility for commission of conduct
prohibited by the statute without requiring proof of a culpable mental state to defraud.
State v. El tog 680 P.2d 727 ('Utah 1984"); Morissette v. United States, 342 U S . 246, 96
L.Ed. 288, 72 S.Ct. 240(1952).
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reasonable doubt the necessary mens re a to establish intent to defraud and thus obtain a
criminal convietioa Utah Code Annotated §76-6-535, on account of such deficiencies
coupled with the presumptions of guilt created by the statute, may be utilized as nothing
more than a collection statute wliich authorizes imprisonment for debt, said practices
being strictly forbidden by the clear meaning of Article I, Section 16 of the Utah
Constitution.
That Section 76-6-505 authorizes imprisonment for debt and becomes even more
apparent upon comparing Section 76-6-505 to the civil liability provisions of Utah Code
Annotated § 7-15-1, (1953 as amended). The necessary elements to establish civil
liability for issuing a bad check under Section UCA 7-15-1 are identical to the elements
necessary to establish criminal liability for issuing a bad check under Section 76-6-505
The Colorado Supreme Court in People v, Vinnola, 177 Colo. 405, 494 P.2d 826
(Colo. 1972) at 830, the Quirt observed:
The trial court found the statute unconstitutional and void because of
vagueness, uncertainty, indefmiteness, ambiguity, and unintelligibility. It
also found that, in some instances, it is selective in prosecution; that the
bank involved has the power to decide whether a party is a criminal or a
favored customer; and finally, that the statute is a eolleeLion statute and
imposes imprisonment for debt.
The Utah Supreme Court has construed Section 7-15-1 "to require that the
signatory of a bad check personally receive benefits, seivices, or money transfer or, in the
alternative, hive actual knowledge that the check is drawn on insufficient funds in order
to be held liable." Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v, Payne, 782 P.2d 464,
467 (Utah App. 1989). In Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. it is sucsinctly
put that to do otherwise would bring the result that "more stringent and onerous burden
9

[would be] thereby imposed on the Plaintiff's counsel than that imposed on his
counterpart the prosecutor/1 This interpretational ine- '^ -i- • anomalous result of a person, being imprisoned for a uc»n h^ uiu noi owi . >et* aiso,
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The provisions of Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-505 should be declared facially
invalid 011 the reasoning that the statute has no nracti?a: application \i: any cast- becai.se
of vagueness and is constitutional
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The provisions of Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-505 should be declared unconstitutionally
vague as applied n l the instant case.
CONCLUSION
The Appellant respectfully submits that the statute undei which she is charged,
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be declared unconstitutional by tins Court and the Information charging the Appellant
with violating Section 76-6-505 should have been dismissed by the trial court..
Respectfully submitted this

/ i/)^

day of

11

N.&M

_> IS195.

A

(b) persons < h n gc d with 1 f* lon\ wluU on pi
badon o! pirob or v\bib bee on hail uv siting
til i l o n i pre v IOUS folonv charge when then is
substantial evidence to suppoit the new folonv
charge 01
((I p( »sons < h u ge (I with \\x\ n( he i OIIIK d< S
ignated bv statute \s OIK tor w b u h bill rniy be
denied if there is substantial evidence to suppoit
the ch \rge and the court finds b\ clear nnd con
vinnng evidence thit the poison would const 1
tute a substantial dinger to \n\ othc r person ot
to the conununitv 01 is h k e h to He* the JUHMIM
tion of the touit if rele<ised on bail
(2) Persons convicted of a crime an bill I I | n I
ing ipf)f il 111 \ i pnM tubulin \ \\\
i *HK
Set

| l \< i s s i w * b a i l mill f u n s
I rm I pun
ishmeiits J
Excessive bail shall not be required excessive fines
shall not be imposed nor shall citiel and unusual
punishments be inflicted Persons ,u rested or linpi i
oned sh ill not b< tie tie d w itb urine ( ess ir\ ? igoi IH'H
Su

9

HI

! I I I H I In

Hit \ I

In capit d cases the light of trial bv puv sh \\\ t«
in uri mviolite In courts of general jurisdiction *^
ccpt in capital cTses a |urv '-hall consist of eight pi
tors In courts of inferior jurisdiction a jurv shall ion
sist of foui juiois In (Tinnn il cases the veichct sh \\\
be un mirnous In civil ( ises three fourths of the ju
rors m i\ find a verchc t A tin m i il < tses sh ill he
waived unless demanded
u**Wi
Su

II
|1 oiiil opt II
K e d i o s s of injur i< s i
Ml uHifts hill b< open iiid every person foi in
injury done to him in bis person property or reput i
tion shall have remedy bv due course of law win h
shall be administered vvitboul dein il oi unnecessuy
delav and no person sinII bf b u red from prosecuting
or defending before anv t n h u m l in this St He b\
himself ot counsel uiv i il t I I M to whit It he l i
partv
>
Sec 12 (Rights of a* * lis* tl (i< i "ions |
In u u n m a i prosecution thr at ti d sh til have tin
right to ippe ir uid defend in person md b\ counsel
to d( in »nd the nitiiM ind c ius< ol the uni^itioii
si| nil I htm to Invi > < oj>> the roof to t< st itv m hi
own be h df to In confionte d bv the witnesses against
him (o h iv< compulsory process to compel the atten
d uic e of w it n< sses in his own be h ilf to have a spc edy
puhlu t n il bv in unpaid il jury of the countv ot chs
tr ict m which the» of1e nsc is alleged to have been com
mitted and the right to appeal in all cases In no
instance shall any accused person, before final judg
ment be compelled to advance monev oi fees to se
cure the rights heiein guaranteed The accused shall
not be compelled to give evidence against himself a
wife shall not be compelled to testify against her bus
band, nor a husband against his wife nor shall anv
person be twin put injeopudv for the same offense
18**

Sec

II

| l*i <<<utiouh\ mini million oi unlit i
ment — Grand jurv I
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted b\
indictment shall be prosecuted bv inform ition after
examination and commitment by a magistrate un
less the examination be waived by the accused with
the consent of the State or by indictment, with or
without such ex unmadon and commitment The foi
mation of the giand jury and the powers and dudes
thereof sh ill bf is pi* sc t IIM d In the 1 egisl if uie i9i?

*« •

""

11 in i nsoiiahlt* HI I M I H S foi biciili i» —
I s s u a n c e of w a n ant I
right of the people to hi s c u m in (hi i pernns houses papers and effects ag nnst unre i m l lr
searches and sei7inos shall not be violated and no
\\ in urt sh ill ismic but upon probable cause sup
polled bv o i t b o r dlirmition parhcularly describing
the pi tec to be searc In d md the person or thing to be
sc I7ed
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(loin ol pr r < li ind of t h e p r e s s —
Libt!}
No I »w sh ill be p isst d to ibridgc oi rcsti un the
freedom of speech or of the press In all criminal pros
editions for libel the truth may be given in evidence
to the jurv and if it shall appear to the jury th it the
matter charged as libelous is true and was published
with good motives and foi justifiable ends, the party
shall be acquitted and the jury shall have the right
to determine the law and the fact
18%
SH

lb

(No i m p r i s o n m e n t foi d b(
I xception I
II H sh ill 1M no mipuson i il I debt except in
( ise s of ibsc onding debtors
18%
See 17 | Elec tions to b e free — S o l d i e r s voting. 1
All elections shill be free and no power civil or
uubtiTN sh ill it my time intc rfere to prevent the
(ice exercise of the light of suffnge Soldiers in time
ol war ma\ vote at the ir post of duty m or out of the
State under regulations to be1 prescribed by law 18%
i

IK

( V H.in (icier
b x post facto l a w s
Im
(i ii ing c o n t r a c t s I
\ \\ \ vl'i nnclu i \ pusi laiU> law or law \m
I mini the obligation of contracts shall be passed
1896

Sec 19 11 r e a s o n defined
Proof I
lie ison against the State shall consist only in
h w i n g war against it or in adhering to its enemies
or in giving them aid and comfort No person shall be
convicted of trenson unless on the testimony of two
witm ssf s to tin s i m e overt act
1896
SPC
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ti)

IMihtriM

•niboidmiite

to

the

civil

pon i i |
i ibt i
h til b< tn s( r ic I s u h o r d m it ion to t IK

n i l power ind no soldier in time of peace shall be
q u u d i e d in anv house without the consent of the
owner nor in tun of w u except in a manner to be
pt( sc» d>e d bv I n\
t«M
Sec 21 | S l a \ c t y t o i b i d d c n l
Nufhei slavery nor involuntary servitude except
I1- i punishment for crime wheieof the party shall
have been dul\ convicted shall exist withm this
St ite
i IM
Se«

22 J P r i v a t c p r o p e r l y Im public use |
Ue property shall not be- taken or damaged foi
• ise without just compensation
mm

I Irrevocable franchises forbidden I
No law shall be passed granting irrevocably any
fi inchise privilege or immunity
1896
Sec 24 (Uniform o p e r a t i o n of l a w s |
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform
operation
1896
Sec 25 l l t i g h t s r e t a i n e d by p e o p l e 1
Ibis enumeration of rights shall not be construed
to nop in oi deny others retained by the people
1896

(iii> property taken is a stallion, maie.
colt, gelding, cow, heifer, steer, o\, hull, calf,
sheep, goat, mule, jack, jenny, swine, or poultry;
(c) as a class A misdemeanor if the value of the
property stolen was mote than $100 hut does not
exceed $250; or
(d) as a class B misdemeanoi if the value of (he
property stolen was $100 or less
(2) Any person who has been injured bv a violation
of Subsection 76-6-40H( 1) may bring an action against
any person mentioned in Subsection 76 6-40H(2)(dt
for three times the amount of actual damages, if any
sustained by the plaintiff, costs of suit and teasonable
attorneys' fees.
iww>
PART 5
FRAUD
76-6-501. Forgery — "Writing" d e n n e d .
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to
defraud anyone, or with knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he:
(a) alters any writing of another without his
authority or utters any such altered writing; or
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates,
issues, transfers, publishes, or utters anv writing
so that the writing or the making, completion,
execution, authentication, issuance, transference, publication or utterance purports to be the
act of another, whether the* person is existent oi
nonexistent, or purports to have been executed at
a time or place or in a numbered sequence other
than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an
original when no such original existed
(2) As used in this section "writing" includes printing or any other method of recording information,
checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges,
trademarks, money, and any other symbols of value,
right, privilege, or identification.
(3) Forgery is a felony of the second degree if the
writing is or purports to be:
(a) a security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument or writing issued by a government, or
any agency thereof; or
(b) a check with a face amount of $100 or
more, an issue of stocks, bonds, or any other instrument or writing representing an inlet est in
or claim against property, or a pecuniary interest
in or claim against any person or enterprise.
(4) Forgery is a felony of the third degree if the
writing is or purports to be a check with a face
amount of less than $100; all other forgery is a class
A misdemeanor.
1975
76-6-502.

P o s s e s s i o n of forged writing or device
for writing.
Any person who, with intent to defraud, knowingly
possesses any writing that is a forgery as defined in
Section 76-6-501, or who with intent to defraud knowingly possesses any device for making any such writing, is guilty of a felony of the third degree, except
where the altering, making, completion, execution,
issuance, transfer, publication, or utterance of such
writing would constitute a clars A misdemeanor, in
which event the possession of the writing or device for
making such a writing shall constitute a class A misdemeanor.
1974

76-6-503.

Fraudulent handling of recordable
writings.
(1 > Any person who with intent to deceive or injun
anyone falsi ties, destroys, removes, or conceals anj
will, deed, mortgage, security instrument, or othei
writing for which HK» law provides public recording!!
guilty of fraudulent handling of recordable writing*
(2) Fraudulent handling of recordable writings iss
felony of the third degree.
1973

76-6-501. Tampering with records.
M) Any person who, having no privilege to do 80,
knowingly falsifies, destroys, removes, or conceall
any writing, other than the writings enumerated in
Section 76-6-503, or record, public or private, with
intent to deceive or injure any person or to conceal
any wrongdoing is guilt v of tampering with records.
(2) Tampering with records is a class B misdemeanor.
1171
76-6-505.

Issuing a bad check or draft — Pre*
sumption.
(1) Any person who issues or passes a check or
draft for the payment of money, for the purpose of
obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, orcor»
poration, any money, property, or other thing of value
or paying for any services, wages, salary, labor, or
rerrt, knowing it will not be paid by the drawee and
payment is refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing
a bad check or draft.
For purposes of this subsection, a person who issues
a check or draft for which payment is refused by the
drawee is presumed to know the check or draft would
not be paid if he had no account with the drawee at
the time of issue
(2) Anv person who issues or passes a checker
draft for the payment of money, for the purpose of
obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or CQf»
poration, any monev, property, or other thing of value
or paying for any services, wages, salary, labor, or
rent, payment of which check or draft is legally it*
fused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad check
or draft if he fails to make good and actual payment
to the payee in the amount of the refused checker
draft within 14 days of his receiving actual noticeof
the check or draft's nonpayment.
"*l
(3) An offense of issuing a bad check or draft shall
be punished as follows:
^'
(a) If the check or draft or series of checksflf)
drafts made or drawn in this state within apa^
riod not exceeding six months amounts to a SUB
of not more than $200, such offense shall be I;
class H misdemeanor.
%
(b) If the check or draft or checks or drato
made or drawn in this state within a period net
exceeding six months amounts to a sum exceed^
ing $200 but not more than $300, such offenefshall be a class A misdemeanor.
*1
(c) If the check or draft or checks or draft*
made or drawn in this state within a period not?
exceeding six months amounts to a sum exceed
ing $300 but not more than $1,000, such ofFentj^
shall be a felony of the third degree.
" ^
(d) If the check or draft or checks or draftr
made or drawn in this state within a period nek
exceeding six months amounts to a sum exoaefe
ing $1,000, such offense shall be a second degztfj
felony.
76-6-506.

Financial transaction card offense*
Definitions.
For purposes of this part:
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(ii) as part of a pattern of illegal activity
involving transactions exceeding $100,000
in any 12-month period
(2) The Utah Division of Investigation shall enforce compliance with Subsection (1) and is custodian
of all information and documents filed under Subsection (1). The information is confidential except any
law enforcement agency, county attorney, district attorney, or the attorney general, when establishing a
clear need for the information for investigative purposes, shall have access and shall maintain the information in a confidential manner except as otherwise
provided by the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
199.1

76-10-1907. Separate offenses.
(1) Under this part each individual currency transaction exceeding $10,000 and made in violation of
Subsection 76-10-1906(1) or each financial transaction in violation of Section 76-10-1903 or 76-10-1904
involving the movement of funds in excess of $10,000
is a separate punishable offense.
(2) Under this part each failure to file a report as
required under Subsection 76-10-1906(1) is a separate punishable ofTense.
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76-10-1908. F o r f e i t u r e — G r o u n d s — P r o c e d u r e
— Disposition of p r o p e r t y forfeited.
(1) Any of the following property shall be subject to
civil forfeiture and no property right exists in it:
(a) any conveyance including vehicles, aircraft, watercraft, or other vessel used in violation
of Section 76-10-1904;
(67 any property mvofvecrYn a fmaricraY transaction in violation of Section 76-10-1903; and
(c) any monetary instruments or funds which
are the subject of a violation of Section
76-10-1903, 76-10-1904, or 76-10-1906.
(2) Property subject to forfeiture under Subsection
(1) may be seized by any peace otficer of this state
upon process issued by any court having jurisdiction
over the property. HnwovfM, nei'/iue without process
may be made when:
(a) the seizure is incident to an arrest or
search under a search warrant, an inspection under an administrative inspection warrant, under
a writ of attachment, or under a writ of garnishment;
(b) the property subject to seizure has been the
subject of a prior judgment in favor of the state in
a criminal injunction or forfeiture proceeding under this section; or
(c) the peace officer has probable cause to believe that the property has been used in violation
of Section 76-10-1903, 76-10-1904, or 76-10-1906.
(3) In the event of seizure under Subsection (2),
proceedings under Subsection (4) shall be instituted
promptly.
(4) Property taken or detained under this section is
ment agency making the seizure, subject only to the
orders and decrees of the court or the official having
jurisdiction. When property is seized under this chapter, the appropriate person or agency m a y
(a) place the property under seal;
(b) remove the property to a place designated
by it or the warrant under which it was seized; or
(c) take custody of the property and remove it
to an appropriate location for disposition in accordance with law.
(5) When any property is subject to civil forfeiture,
a determination for forfeiture to the state shall be
made as follows:

zyo

(a) A complaint verified on oath or affirmation
shall be prepared by the prosecuting agency
where the property was seized or is to be seized.
A complaint shall be filed in the circuit or district
court if the property is not real property and the
value is less than $20, Of It). The complaint shall
be filed in the district court if the value of property other than real property is $20,000 or more
or the property is real property If the complaint
includes property under the jurisdiction of the
circuit court and also property under the exclusive jurisdiction of the district court, the complaint shall be filed in the district court. The
complaint shall describe with reasonable particularity
(i) the property which is the subject matter of the proceedings;
(ii) the date and place of seizure, if known;
and
(iii) the allegations which constitute a basis for forfeiture.
(b) Upon filing the complaint, the clerk of the
court shall forthwith issue a warrant for seizure
of the property which is the subject matter of the
action and deliver it to a peace officer for service,
unless the property has previously been seized
without a warrant under Subsection (2). If the
property was seized under Subsection (2), the
warrant of seizure shall be delivered to the officer having custody of the property who shall proceed as directed in the warrant.
(c) Notice of the seizure and intended forfeiture snaft ne (i(ed wi((\ l(w county cferk, aad
served together with a copy of the complaint,
upon all persons known to the prosecuting
agency to have a claim in the property by one of
the following methods*
(i) upon each claimant whose name and
address is known, at the last known address
of the claimant, or upon each owner whose
right, title, or interest is of record in the Division ot Motor Vehicles, by mailing a copy
of the notice and complaint by certified mail
to the address given upon the records of the
division, which service is considered complete even though the mail is refused or cannot be forwarded; and
(ii) upon all other claimants whose addresses are unknown, but who are believed
to have an interest in the property, by one
publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the county where the seizure was
made.
(d) Except under Subsection (5)(e), any claimant or interested party shall file with the court a
verified answer to the complaint within 20 days
after service has been obtained.
(e) When property is seized under this section,
any interested person or claimant of the profh
erty, prior to being served with a complaint under this section, may file a petition in the court
having jurisdiction for release of his interest in
the property. The petition shall specify the claimant's interest in the property and his right to
have it released. A copy shall be served upon the
county attorney in the county of the seizure, who
shall answer the petition within 20 days. A petitioner need not answer a complaint of forfeiture,
(f) After 20 days following service of a complaint or petition for release, the court shall examine the record and if no answer is on file, the
court shall allow the complainant or petitioner
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in opportunity to piesent evidence in suppoit ol
his claim and ordei foifeituie oi lelease ol the
property as the court determines 11 a piosecuting
Igency has not filed an answei to a petition foi
release and the court determines from the evidence that the petitioner is not entitled to lecov
Bry of the property, it shall entei an older direct
ing the prosecuting agency to answei the petition
within ten days If no answer is filed within that
penod, the court shall order the lelease oi the
property to the petitionei entitled to leceive it
(g) When an answer to a complaint or petition
appears of record at the end of 20 days, the couit
shall set the matter for hearing within 20 days
At this hearing all interested paities ma)
present evidence of their rights of release of the
property following the state's evidence foi foifei
ture The court shall deteimine by a pieponder
ance of the evidence the issues in the case and
order forfeiture oi lelease of the piopeily as it
determines
(h) When the court determines that claimants
have no right in the propel ty in whole or in par t,
it shall declare the property to be foifeited and
direct it to be deliveied as provided m Subsection
(6)
(l) When the couit determines that piopeity,
in whole or in part, is not subject to forfeituie it
shall order release of the piopeity to the pioper
claimant If the court detei mines that the pi op
erty is subject to forfeiture and release in pait, it
shall order partial lelease and paitial foifeituie
When the property cannot be divided loi paitial
forfeiture and release, the unnt shall oider it
sold and the pioceeds distributed
0) first, to defra> the costs of the action,
including seizure, stoiage of the piopeity, le
gal costs of filing and pui suing the foi lei
ture, and costs of sale,
(n) second, piopoitionally among the le
gitimate claimants, and
(ill) third, as piovided undei Subsection
(6)
r
6) Disposition of all piopeity toifeited undei Sub
Aions (1) through (5) by a finding of the couit that
person is entitled to iecov< I the piopeity shall be
follows
(a) Pioperty foifeited undei Subsections (l)(a),
(b), or (c), if the property is involved in a financial transaction in violation of Section
76-10-1903 or is transported in violation of Sec
tion 76-10-1904, may be awarded to the seizing
agency upon a petition the pioperty in the com
plaint filed under Subsection (5Ha) and a finding
by the court that the seizing agency is able to use
the forfeited piopeity in the enforcement of of
fenses under Title 58 and Title 76, Chapter 10
(b) If the seizing agency makes no application
or the court does not make a finding undei Sub
section (6)(a) that the seizing agency should be
awarded the pioperty, the forfeited property
shall be deposited in the custody of the Division
of Finance Any state agency, buieau, county,
municipality, or di ug strike force which demon
strates a need foi specific property oi classes of
property which has been foifeited shall be given
the property for use in enfoi cement of laws pio
hibiting specified unlawful activity or in enforce
ment of this pait after payment to the prosecut
ing agency of legal costs for filing and pursuing
the forfeiture and upon the application for the
nrnnprrv in the directoi of the Division of Fi
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nance The application shall clearly set forth the
need foi the property and the use to which the
piopeity will be put
(c) The director of the Division of Finance
shall review all applications for property deposited undei Subsection (6Kb) and make a determination based on necessity and advisability as to
final disposition and shall notify the designated
applicant, who may obtain the property after
payment of all costs to the appropriate department The Division of Finance shall reimburse
the piosecuting agency for costs of filing and pur
suing the forfeiture action not to exceed the
amount of the net pioceeds leceived tiom the sale
ol the piopeity
(d) If no disposition is made upon an applica
tion undei Subsections (6Ha), (b), oi (c), the Divi
sion of finance shall dispose of the property by
public bidding ot, as consideicd appiopnate, by
dcstiuction Pioceeds fioiu the sale of the pi op
city undei this subsection shall be distiibuted as
provided in Subsection (e)
(e) Propeity forfeited undei Subsection (l)(c)
for violation of Subsection 76 10 1906 and pio
ceeds iiom the sale ot the piopeitv under Suhsec
tion (6)(d) shall be awarded and oidered distrib
uted to the General Fund
(7) Any peison who violates any piovision of Section 76 10 1901, 76 10 1904 oi 76 10 1906 shall for
felt to the state all piopeity, funds, oi monetary in
struments involved in the violation oi, if unavailable
for foifeituie in species its value whether oi not lo
cated in this state
(8) Upon conviction foi violating any piovision of
Section 76 10 1903, 76 10 1904, oi 76 10 1906, the
couit may make an oidei with respect to any property
of the defendant, or in which the defendant has an
inteiest, whether or not in this state, to accomplish oi
further the foifeituie piovided under Subsection (7)
oi the collection of costs under this section
(9) All lights, title and inteiest in toifeitable prop
eity desciibed in this section vest in the state upon
the commission of the ac t oi conduct giving i lse to the
foiteiture under this section
(10) (a) Aftei forfeituie of pioperty under this section the couit shall duect the disposition of the
piopeity by sale oi othei commeicially feasible
means, making provision foi the lights of any
innocent pel sons Any propei ty right or interest
not exercisable by oi transferable for value to the
state expires and does not teveil to the defendant The defendant oi any person acting in conceit with or on behalf of the defendant is not
eligible to puichase forfeited pioperty at any sale
oidered by the couit
(b) The couit may lestiain oi stay the sale or
disposition of the propei ty pending the conclusion of any appeal of the criminal case giving rise
to the forfeiture, if the applicant demonstrates
that proceeding with the sale oi disposition of the
propei ty would lesult in lneparable injury,
harm, or loss to him
(c) The pioceeds ot any sale or other disposition of property forfeited under this section or
any monies forfeited may be used first to pay the
expenses of the forfeituie and the sale including
expenses of seizuie, maintenance, and custody of
the propei ty pending its disposition, advertising,
and couit costs
(d) Disposition ot piopeity foifeited under Sub
sections (7) through (13) shall be as provided in
Subsection (6)
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(e) Notwithstanding any provisions of litis s'*''
lion to the contrary, the stale is obligated <o
search the lion records applicable to the forfeit
able property to determine whether any valid
lien against the property has been perfected. As
long as the lien holder did not violate the provi
sions of this section, till" to forfeitable properly
shail be subject to such lien, and 1he slate will
either give possession oft he property to the lien
holder or pay to the lien holder the amount se
cured by the lien.
(11) In any forfeiture proceeding under Subsections (7) through (I'D, the prosecutor prosecuting the
defendant may:
(a) petition the court for mitigation or remission of forfeiture, for restoration of forfeited prop
erty to victims of a violation of this section or to
take any other action to protect the rights of innocent persons in the interest of justice and the
court may, in its discretion, giant the petition;
fb) compromise claims arising under this sec
tion;
(c) award compensation to persons providing
information resulting in a forfeiture under this
section; or
(d) take appropriate measures necessary to
safeguard and maintain properly ordered lor
feited under this section pending its disposition.
(12) In a proceeding under Ibis section where forfeiture is declared, in whole or in part, the '-ourI
shall:
(a) determine the costs incurred by the prosecuting agency prosecuting the forfeiture which
shall be paid by the recipient of forfeited assets
from the proceeds from the assets; arrd
(b) assess all costs of the forfeiture proceeding
including seizure and storage of the property
against the individual or individuals whose con
duct was the basis for the forfeiture, and may
assess costs against any other claimant or claim
ants to the properly as appropriate.
(13) Proceedings under this section arc independent of any other proceedings whether civil or crimi
rral under this section or the laws of this st.ate.
IW:I
PA HI 20
SECURITY OF RESEARCH FACILITIES
76-10-2001. Definitions.
As used in this part:
(1) "Building," in addition to its commonly-accepted meaning, means any waler craft, aircraft,
trailer, sleeping car. or other structure or vehicle
adapted for overnight accommodations of persons
or for carrying on business and includes:
fa) each separately secured or occupied
portion of the building or vehicle; arrd
fb) each structure appurtenant or connected to the building or vehicle.
(2) "Enter** means:
fa) an intrusion of any part of the body; or
(b) the intrusion of any physical object.
sound wave, light ray, electronic signal, or
other means of intrusion under- the control of
the actor.
(3) "Research" means studious arrd serious inquiry, examination, investigation, or experimentation aimed at the discovery, examination, or
accumulation of facts, data, devices, theories,
technologies, or applications done for any public,
governmental, proprietorial, or teaching purpose.

i4) "Research facility" means any building, or
separately seemed yard. pad. pond, laboratory,
pasture, pen, or corral which is not open to the
public, the major vise of which is to conduct research, to bruise research subjects, to store supplies, equipment, samples, specimens, records,
data, prototypes, or othe? property used in or
generated (mm ves»n\vch.
WW
70-10-2002. Burglary of a research facility —
Penalties.
f I ) A person is guilty of burglary of a research facility if he enters or i"mains unlawfully in a research
facility with the intent to:
fa) obtain unauthorized control over any proper tv, sarrrple, specimen, record, data, test result,
or proprietary information in the facility;
(h) alter or eradicate any sample, specimen,
record, dala, test result, or* proprietary information in (he facility;
<c> damage, deface, or destroy any property in
the facility;
id) release from confinement or remove any
animal, or biological vector in the facility regardless of whether or not that animal or vector is
dangerous;
le) commit an assault on any person;
<f> commit any other felony; or
fg) inter fete with the personnel or operations
of a research facility through any conduct that
does rrot constitute an assault.
(2) A person who violates Subsection (l)(g) is
guilty of a class A misdemeanor. A person who violates any other provision in this section is guilty of a
felony of the second degree
1989
PART 21
MISUSE OF RFC Yi'LING BINS
70-10-2101. Use of recycling bins — Prohibited
items —•• Penalties.
( I ) As used in this section:

in> "Recycling" means the process of collecting
materials diverted from the waste stream for reuse.
<hr "Recycling bin" moans anv receptacle made
available to the public by a governmental entity
or private business for the collection of any
source-separated it-em for recycling purposes.
*2) It. is an infraction to place any prohibited item
or substance in a recycling bin if the hin is posted
with the following information printed legibly in basic English:
(a) a descriptive list of the items that may be
deposited in the recycling bin, entitled in boldface capital letters: "ITEMS YOU MAY DEPOSIT IN THIS RECYCLING BIN:";
(b) at the ^r\(\ of the list in Subsection (a), the
following statement in boldface capital letters:
"REMOVING FROM THIS BIN ANY ITEM
THAT IS LISTED ABOVE AND THAT Y'OU
DID NOT PLACE IN THE CONTAINER IS THE
CRIMINAL OFFENSE OF THEFT, PUNISHABLE BY LAW";
fc) the following statement in boldface capital
letters: "DEPOSIT OF ANY OTHER ITEM IN
THIS RECYCLING BIN IS AGAINST THE
LAW.";
(d) the following statement in boldface capital
letters, posted on the recycling collection container in close proximity to the notices required
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Rule 26. Appeals.
• a) An appeal is taken by filing with the clerk of the court from which the
appeal is taken a notice of appeal stating the order or judgment appealed from
and by serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party or his attorney of record.
Proof of service of such copy shall be filed with the court.
ib) An appeal may be taken by the defendant:
(1) From the final judgment of conviction;
(2) From an order made, after judgment, affecting the substantial
rights of the defendant;
(3) From an interlocutory order when, upon petition for review, the
Supreme Court decides that such an appeal would be in the interest of
justice; or
(4) From any order of the court judging the defendant by reason of a
mental disease or defect, incompetent to proceed further in a pending
prosecution.
«c) An appeal may be taken by the prosecution:
(1) From a final judgment of dismissal;
(2) From an order arresting judgment:
(3) From an order terminating the prosecution because of a finding of
double jeopardy or denial of a speedy trial:
'4) From a judgment of the court holding a statute or any part thereof
invalid: or
<5i From an order of the court granting a pre-trial motion to suppress
evidence when, upon a petition for review, the Supreme Court decides
that such an appeal would be in the interest of justice,
•d) (1) All appeals in criminal cases shall be taken within 30 days after the
entry of the judgment appealed from, or, if a motion for a new trial or
arrest of judgment is made, within 30 days after notice of the denial of the
motion is given to the defendant or his counsel. Proof of giving such notice
shall be filed with the court.
(2) No appeal shall be dismissed except for a material defect in the
taking thereof, or for failure to perfect the appeal, or upon motion of the
appellant. The dismissal of the appeal affirms the judgment unless another appeal can be, and is, timely taken.
'e> Cases appealed in which the defendant is unable to post bond shall be
given a preferred and expeditious setting in the appellate court.
< f) Appeals may be submitted on briefs and if an appellant's brief is filed
the appeal shall be decided even though a party, upon due notice of the hearing, shall fail to appear for oral argument.
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Rule 26

(gj The rules of civil procedure relating to appeals shall govern criminal
appeals to the Supreme Court except as otherwise provided.
(h) In capital cases where the sentence of death has been imposed, the case
shall be automatically reviewed by the Supreme Court within 60 days after
certification by the sentencing court of the entire record unless the time is
extended by the Supreme Court for good cause. A case involving the sentence
of death shall have priority over all other cases in setting for hearing and in
disposition by the Supreme Court.
(i) The rules of practice for district and circuit courts promulgated by the
judicial council and approved by the Supreme Court relating to appeals from
circuit courts shall govern criminal as well as civil appeals.
(j) An appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court from all final orders and
judgments rendered in a district court or juvenile court in accordance with the
provisions of this rule.
ik) An appeal may be taken to the district court from a judgment rendered
in the justice court in accordance with the provision of this rule, except as
follows:
'1) The case shall be tried anew in the district court and the decision of
the district court shall be final except in cases where the validity or
constitutionality of a statute or ordinance is raised in the justice court:
12) Within 20 days after receipt of the notice of appeal, the justice court
shall transmit to the district court a certified copy of the docket, the
original pleadings, all notices, motions and other papers filed in the case
and the notice ana undertaking on appeal:
3) Stay of execution and relief pending appeal shall be in accordance
with Rule 27; and
14) All further proceedings shall be in the district court, including anyprocess required to enforce judgment.
(77-35-26, enacted by L. 1980. ch. 14. $ 1: L. 1983, ch. 51. $ 1.:
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 1983 amendment suostituted 'Rule 27" for 'Rule 30" :n
Subsection • k>«3).
Compiler's Notes. — This rule governs appeals to the Supreme Court from district and
circuit courts. The practice and procedure for
taking such appeals, including the r ime in
which the appeal is filed, is prescribed by -.he
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Cross-References. — Appeal lies from finai
judgments. Utah Const.. Art. VIII. Sec. 9.
ADpeais from circuit court '0 district court.
? 78-4-11.
Appeals from district court. Utah Const..
Art. VIII. Sec. 9.

Appeals from justice's court to district court.
Utah Const.. Art. VIII. Sec. 9: 5 78-5-14.
ADpeilate jurisdiction of district courts. Utah
Const.. Art. VIII. Sec. 7: * 78-3-4.
Appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court.
Utah Const.. Art. VIII. Sec. 4: * 78-2-2.
Applicability of Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rule 1.
Dismissal if affidavit n impecumositv -.s
antrue. $ 21-7-7.
Right of defendant to appeal. Utah Const..
Art. I. Sec. 12: $ 77-L-tf.
Right of indigent accused 10 counsel m appeal. ? 77-32-1 et seq.
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58 L Ed 2d

[439 US 379]

ALDO COLAUTTI, Secretary of Welfare of Pennsylvania, et al., Appellants,
v
JOHN FRANKLIN et al.
439 US 379, 58 L Ed 2d 596, 99 S Ct 675
[No. 77-891]
Argued October 3, 1978. Decided January 9, 1979.
SUMMARY

In an action brought in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania prior to the effective date of the Pennsylvania
Abortion Control Act, the District Court held unconstitutional certain
provisions of the Act, among others, the viability determination and standard of care provisions of § 5(a) of the Act, requiring, upon pain of penal
sanction for its violation, that every person performing or inducing an
abortion (1) make a determination "based on his experience, judgment, or
professional competence that the fetus is not viable," and (2) upon determining that a fetus "is viable or . . . may be viable" to "exercise that degree of
professional skill, care and diligence to preserve the life and health of the
fetus which such person would be required to exercise in order to preserve
the life and health of any fetus intended to be born and not aborted" and to
adopt that abortion technique "which would provide the best opportunity
for the fetus to be aborted alive so long as a different technique would not
be necessary in order to preserve the life or health of the mother" (401 F
Supp 554). On direct appeal to the United States Supreme Court from the
decision of the three-judge District Court, the Supreme Court vacated part
of the District Court's judgment and remanded the case (49 L Ed 2d 1204).
Among other things, the three-judge District Court, on remand, adhered to
its original view regarding § 5(a)'s unconstitutionality, and declared § 5(a)'s
provisions invalid on vagueness and overbreadth grounds.
On direct appeal, the United States Supreme Court affirmed. In an
opinion by BLACKMUN, J., joined by BRENNAN, STEWART, MARSHALL, POWELL,
and STEVENS, JJ., it was held that § 5(a) of the Act was unconstitutionally
vague both as to its requirement for determining viability and as to its
requirement concerning standard of care.
Briefs of Counsel, p 959, infra.
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71 L Ed 2d

[455 US 489]

VILLAGE OF HOFFMAN ESTATES, et al., Appellants,
v
FLIPSIDE, HOFFMAN ESTATES, INC.
455 US 489, 71 L Ed 2d 362, 102 S Ct 1186, reh den (US) 72 L Ed 2d 476,
102 S Ct 2023
[No. 80-1681]
Argued December 9, 1981. Decided March 3, 1982.
Decision: Municipal ordinance requiring license to sell "items designed or
marketed for use with illegal cannabis or drugs," held not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad.
SUMMARY

A village enacted an ordinance regulating the sale of drug paraphernalia.
The ordinance requires a business to obtain a license if it sells any items
that are "designed or marketed for use with illegal cannabis or drugs". A
store selling drug paraphernalia in the village brought an action in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois challenging
the ordinance prior to its enforcement as unconstitutionally vague and
overbroad. The District Court upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
reversed, holding that the ordinance was impermissibly vague on its face
(639 F2d 373).
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded. In
an opinion by MARSHALL, J., expressing the view of BURGER, Ch. J., and
BRENNAN, BLACKMUN, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ., it was held
that (1) the ordinance did not infringe upon the First Amendment rights of
a merchandiser of items purported to be regulated by the ordinance and was
not overbroad as inhibiting the First Amendment rights of other parties
since (a) the ordinance does not restrict speech as such but simply regulates
the commercial marketing of items that the labels reveal may be used for
an illicit purpose and thus the ordinance does not embrace noncommercial
speech, (b) insofar as any commercial speech interest was implicated, it was
only the attenuated interest in displaying and marketing merchandise in
the manner the retailer desires, and (c) it was irrelevant whether the
Briefs of Counsel, p 974, infra.
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US 87, 90, 15 L Ed 2d 176, 86 S Ct
211 (1965). Our concern here is
based upon the "potential for arbitrarily suppressing First Amendment liberties. . . ." Id., at 91, 15 L
Ed 2d 176, 86 S Ct 211. In addition,
§ 647(e) implicates consideration of
the constitutional right to freedom
of movement. See Kent v Dulles, 357
US 116, 126, 12 L Ed 2d 1204, 78 S
Ct 1113 (1958); Aptheker v Secretary
of State, 378 US 500, 505-506, 12 L
Ed 2d 992, 84 S Ct 1659 (1964).*

75 L Ed 2d

Cal App 3d, at 438, 108 Cal Rptr, at
872-873. In addition, the suspect
may also have to account for his
presence "to the extent it assists in
producing
[461 US 360]

credible and reliable identification.,, Id., at 438, 108 Cal Rptr,
at 872.

Section 647(e) is not simply a
"stop-and-identify" statute. Rather,
the statute requires that the individual provide a "credible and reliable''
identification that carries a "reasonable assurance" of its authenticity,
and that provides "means for later
getting in touch with the person who
has identified himself." Solomon, 33

[10a] At oral argument, the appellants confirmed that a suspect violates § 647(e) unless "the officer [is]
satisfied that the identification is
reliable." Tr of Oral Arg 6. In giving
examples of how suspects would satisfy the requirement, appellants explained that a jogger, who was not
carrying identification, could, depending on the particular officer, be
required to answer a series of questions concerning the route that he
followed to arrive at the place where
the officers detained him,9 or could
satisfy the identification require-

8. [ 9 b ] In his dissent, Justice White claims
that ,f [t]he upshot of our cases
is that
whether or not a statute purports to regulate
constitutionally protected conduct, it should
not be held unconstitutionally vague on its
face unless it is vague in all of its possible
applications." Post, at 370, 75 L Ed 2d, at
917-918. The description of our holdings is
inaccurate in several respects First, it neglects the fact that we permit a facial challenge if a law reaches "a substantial amount
of constitutionally protected conduct" Hoffman Estates v Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc ,
455 US 489, 494, 71 L Ed 2d 362, 102 S Ct
1186 (1982) Second, where a statute imposes
criminal penalties, the standard of certainty
is higher. See Winters v New York, 333 US
507, 515, 92 L Ed 840, 68 S Ct 665 (1948) This
concern has, at times, led us to invalidate a
criminal statute on its face even when it
could conceivably have had some valid application. See, e.g, Colautti v Franklin, 439 US
379, 394-401, 58 L Ed 2d 596, 99 S Ct 675
(1979); Lanzetta v New Jersey, 306 US 451, 85
L Ed 888, 59 S Ct 618 (1939) The dissent
concedes t h a t "the overbreadth doctrine permits facial challenge of a law that reaches a
substantial amount of conduct protected by
the First Amendment
. " Post, at 371, 75 L
Ed 2d, at 918. However, in the dissent's view,
one may not "confuse vagueness and overbreadth by attacking the enactment as being
vague as applied to conduct other than his

own " Post, at 37'), 75 L Ed 2d, at 917. But we
have traditionally viewed vagueness and overbreadth as logically related and similar doctrines See, e g , Keyishian v Board of Regents, 385 US 589, 609, 17 L Ed 2d 629, 87 S
Ct 675 (1967); NAACP v Button, 371 US 415,
433, 9 L Ed 2d 405, 83 S Ct 328 (1963) See
also Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in
the Supreme Court, 109 U Pa L Rev 67, 110113(1960)
No authority cited by the dissent supports
its argument about facial challenges in the
arbitrary enforcement context. The dissent
relies heavily on Parker v Levy, 417 US 733,
41 L Ed 2d 439, 94 S Ct 2547 (1974), but in
that case we deliberately applied a less stringent vagueness analysis "[b]ecause of the factors differentiating military society from civilian society " Id , at 756, 41 L Ed 2d 439, 94 S
Ct 2547 Hoffman Estates, supra, also relied
upon by the dissent, does not support its
position In addition to reaffirming the validity of facial challenges in situations where
free speech or free association are affected,
see 455 US, at 494, 495, 498-499, 71 L Ed 2d
362, 102 S Ct 1186, the Court emphasized that
the ordinance in Hoffman Estates "simply
regulates business behavior*' and that "economic regulation is subject to a less strict
vagueness test because its subject matter is
often more narrow." Id , at 499, 498, 71 L Ed
2d 362, 102 S C t 1186

[461 US 359]
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facial validity of § 6^
valuating a facial cha'
state
law, a federal cou:
jourse,
consider any limiting
instruction
that a state court or enforcement
agency has proffered." Hoffman Estates v Flipside, Hoffman Estates,
Inc., 455 US 489, 494, n 5, 71 L Ed
2d 362, 102 S Ct 1186 (1982). As
construed by the California Court of
Appeal,4 § 647(e) requires that an
individual

tion.8 People v Solomon, 33 Cal App
3d 429, 108 Cal Rptr 867
[461 US 357]

(1973). "Credible and reliable" identification is defined by the state Court of Appeal as
identification "carrying reasonable
assurance that the identification is
authentic and providing means for
later getting in touch with the person who has identified himself." Id.,
at 438, 108 Cal Rptr, at 873. In addi[461 US 356]
provide "credible and reli- tion, a suspect may be required to
able" identification when requested "account for his presence . . . to the
by a police officer who has reason- extent it assists in producing credible
able suspicion of criminal activity and reliable identification.. . ."Id., at
sufficient to justify a Terry deten- 438, 108 Cal Rptr, at 872. Under the
3. The appellants have apparently never
challenged the propriety of declaratory and
injunctive relief in this case. See Steffel v
Thompson, 415 US 452, 39 L Ed 2d 505, 94 S
Ct 1209 (1974). Nor have appellants ever challenged Lawson's standing to seek such relief.
We note that Lawson has been stopped on
approximately 15 occasions pursuant to
§ 647(e), and that these 15 stops occurred in a
period of less than two years. Thus, there is a
"credible threat" that Lawson might be detained again under § 647(e). See Ellis v Dyson,
421 US 426, 434, 44 L Ed 2d 274, 95 S Ct 1691
(1975).
4. [3b, 4b] In Wainwright v Stone, 414 US
21, 22-23, 38 L Ed 2d 179, 94 S a 190 (1973),
we held that "[f]or the purpose of determining
whether a state statute is too vague and
indefinite to constitute valid legislation 'we
must take the statute as though it read precisely as the highest court of the State has
interpreted i t ' Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v
Probate Court, 309 US 270, 273 [84 L Ed 744,
60 S a 523, 126 ALR 530] (1940)." The Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted in its
decision that the state intermediate appellate
court has construed the statute in People v
Solomon, 33 Cal App 3d 429, 108 Cal Rptr 867
(1973), that the State Supreme Court has
refused review, and that Solomon has been
the law of California for nine years. In these
circumstances, we agree with the Ninth Circuit that the Solomon opinion is authoritative
for purposes of defining the meaning of
§ 647(e). See 658 F2d 1362, 1364-1365, n 3
(1981).
5. [5b] The Solomon court apparently read
Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 20 L Ed 2d 889, 88 S
Ct 1868, 44 Ohio Ops 2d 383 (1968) to hold
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that the test for a Terry detention was
whether the officer had information that
would lead a reasonable man to believe that
the intrusion was appropriate. The Ninth
Circuit noted that according to Terry, the
applicable test under the Fourth Amendment
requires that the police officer making a detention "be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably
warrant that intrusion." 392 US, at 21, 20 L
Ed 2d 889, 88 S a 1868, 44 Ohio Ops 2d 383.
The Ninth Circuit then held that although
what Solomon articulated as the Terry standard differed from what Terry actually held,
"[w]e believe that the Solomon court meant to
incorporate in principle the standards enunciated in Terry." 658 F2d, at 1366, n 8. We
agree with that interpretation of Solomon. Of
course, if the Solomon court misread Terry
and interpreted § 647(e) to permit investigative detentions in situations where the officers
lack a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity based on objective facts, Fourth Amendment concerns would be implicated. See
Brown v Texas, 443 US 47, 61 L Ed 2d 357, 99
S a 2637 (1979).
In addition, the Solomon court appeared to
believe that both the Terry detention and
frisk were proper under the standard for
Terry detentions, and since the frisk was
more intrusive than the request for identification, the request for identification must be
proper under Terry. See 33 Cal App 3d, at
435, 108 Cal Rptr, at 870-871. The Ninth
Circuit observed that the Solomon analysis
was "slightly askew." 658 F2d, at 1366, n 9.

461 US 352, 75 L Ed 2d 903, 103 S Ct 1855

terms of the statute, failure of the
individual to provide "credible and
reliable" identification permits the
arrest. 6
Ill
[6] Our Constitution is designed to
maximize individual
freedoms
within a framework of ordered liberty. Statutory limitations on those
freedoms are examined for substantive authority and content as well as
for definiteness or certainty of expression. See generally M. Bassiouni,
Substantive Criminal Law 53 (1978).
[7, 8] As generally stated, the voidfor-vagueness doctrine requires that
a penal statute define the criminal
offense with sufficient definiteness
that ordinary people can understand
what conduct is prohibited and in a
manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Hoffman Estates v Flipside,
Hoffman Estates, Inc., supra; Smith
v Goguen, 415 US 566, 39 L Ec 2d
605, 94 S Ct 1242 (1974); Grayned v
City of Rockford, 408 US 104, 33 L
Ed 2d 222, 92 S a 2294 (1972);
Papachristou v City of Jacksonville,
405 US 156, 31 L Ed 2d 110, 92 S Ct
839 (1972); Connally v General Construction Co., 269 US 385, 70 L Ed
322, 46 S Ct 126 (1926). Although
the doctrine focuses

ment, we have recognized recently
that the more important aspect of
the vagueness doctrine "is not actual
notice, but the other principal element of the doctrine—the requirement that a legislature establish
minimal guidelines to govern law
enforcement" Smith, 415 US, at
574, 39 L Ed 2d 605, 94 S Ct 1242.
Where the legislature fails to provide such minimal guidelines, a
criminal statute may permit "a standardless sweep [that] allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilections." Id.,
at 575, 39 L Ed 2d 605, 94 S a
1242.7

both on actual notice to citizens and arbitrary enforce-

[9a] Section 647(e), as presently
drafted and as construed by the
state courts, contains no standard
for determining what a suspect has
to do in order to satisfy the requirement to provide a "credible and reliable" identification. As such, the
statute vests virtually complete discretion in the hands of the police to
determine whether the suspect has
satisfied the statute and must be
permitted to go on his way in the
absence of probable cause to arrest.
An individual, whom police may
think is suspicious but do not have
probable cause to believe has committed a crime, is entitled to continue to walk the public streets
"only at the whim of any police
officer" who happens to stop that
individual under § 647(e). Shuttlesworth v City of Birmingham, 382

The court reasoned that under Terry, the
frisk, as opposed to the detention, is proper
only if the detaining officer reasonably believes that the suspect may be armed and
dangerous, in addition to having an articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.
6. In People v Caylor, 6 Cal App 3d 51, 56,
85 Cal Rptr 497, 501 (1970), the court suggested that the State must prove that a suspect detained under § 647(e) was loitering or
wandering for "evil purposes." However, in
Solomon, which the court below and the parties concede is "authoritative" in the absence
of a California Supreme Court decision on the

issue, there is no discussion of any requirement that the State prove "evil purposes."
7. Our concern for minimal guidelines finds
its roots as far back as our decision in United
States v Reese, 92 US 214, 221, 25 L Ed 563
(1876):
"It would certainly be dangerous if the
legislature could set a net large enough to
catch all possible offenders, and leave it to the
courts to step inside and say who could be
rightfully detained, and who should be set at
large. This would, to some extent, substitute
the judicial for the legislative department of
government."

[461 US 358]
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Terry, the balance of interests described in that case and its progeny
must control.
Second, it goes without saying that
arrest and the threat of a criminal
sanction have a substantial impact
on interests protected by the Fourth
Amendment, far more severe than
[461 US 368]

we have ever permitted on less than
probable cause. Furthermore, the
likelihood that innocent persons accosted by law enforcement officers
under authority of § 647(e) will have
no realistic means to protect their
rights compounds the severity of the
intrusions on individual liberty that
this statute will occasion. The arrests it authorizes make a mockery
of the right enforced in Brown v
Texas, 443 US 47, 61 L Ed 2d 357, 99
S Ct 2637 (1979), in which we held
squarely that a State may not make
it a crime to refuse to provide identification on demand in the absence of
reasonable suspicion.5 If § 647(e) remains in force, the validity of such
arrests will be open to challenge
only after the fact, in individual
prosecutions for failure to produce
identification. Such case-by-case
scrutiny cannot vindicate the Fourth
Amendment rights of persons like
appellee, many of whom will not
even be prosecuted after they are
5. In Brown we had no need to consider
whether the State can make it a crime to
refuse to provide identification on demand
during a seizure permitted by Terry, when
the police have reasonable suspicion but not
probable cause. See 443 US, at 53, n 3, 61 L
Ed 2d 357, 99 S a 2637.
6. Even after arrest, however, he may not
be forced to answer questions against his will,
and—in contrast to what appears to be normal procedure during Terry encounters—he
will be so informed See Miranda v Arizona,
384 US 436, 16 L Ed 2d 694, 86 S a 1602, 10
Ohio Misc 9, 36 Ohio Ops 2d 237, 10 ALR3d
974 (1966). In fact, if he indicates a desire to
remain silent, the police, should cease questioning him altogether. Id., at 473-474, 16 L
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arrested, see ante, at 354, 75 L Ed
2d, at 907. A pedestrian approached
by police officers has no way of
knowing whether the officers have
" r e a s o n a b l e suspicion"—without
which they may not demand identification even under § 647(e), ante, at
356, and n 5, 75 L Ed 2d, at 908—
because that condition depends
solely on the objective facts known
to the officers and evaluated in light
of their experience, see Terry v
Ohio, 392 US, at 30, 20 L Ed 2d 889,
88 S Ct 1868, 44 Ohio Ops 2d 383;
United States v Brignoni-Ponce, 422
US, at 884-885, 45 L Ed 2d 607, 95 S
Ct 2574. The pedestrian will know
that to assert his rights may subject
him to arrest and all that goes with
it: new acquaintances among jailers,
lawyers, prisoners, and bail bondsmen, firsthand knowledge of local
jail conditions, a "search incident to
arrest," and the expense of defending against a possible prosecution.'
The only response to be
[461 US 369]

expected is
compliance with the officers' requests,
whether or not they are based on reasonable suspicion, and without regard
to the possibility of later vindication
in court. Mere reasonable suspicion
does not justify subjecting the innocent to such a dilemma.7
Ed 2d 694, 86 S a 1602, 10 Ohio Misc 9, 36
Ohio Ops 2d 237, 10 ALR3d 974.
7. When law enforcement officers have
probable cause to believe that a person has
committed a crime, the balance of interests
between the State and the individual shifts
significantly, so that the individual may be
forced to tolerate restrictions on liberty and
invasions of privacy that possibly will never
be redressed, even if charges are dismissed or
the individual is acquitted. Such individuals
may be arrested, and they may not resist. But
probable cause, and nothing less, represents
the point at which the interests of law enforcement justify subjecting an individual to
any significant intrusion beyond that sanc-

KOLENDER v LAWSON
461 US 352, 75 L Ed !d5 903, 103 S Ct 1855

By defining as a crime the failure
to respond to requests for personal
information during a Terry encounter, and by permitting arrests upon
commission of that crime, California
attempts in this statute to compel
what may not be compelled under
the Constitution. Even if § 647(e)
were not unconstitutionally vague,
the Fourth Amendment would prohibit its enforcement.
Justice White, with whom Justice
Rehnquist joins, dissenting.
The usual rule is that the alleged
vagueness of a criminal statute must
be judged in light of the conduct
that is charged to be violative of the
statute. See, e.g., United States v
Mazurie, 419 US 544, 550, 42 L Ed
2d 706, 95 S a 710 (1975); United
States v Powell, 423 US 87, 92-93,
46 L Ed 2d 228, 96 S Ct 316 (1975). If
the actor is given sufficient notice
that his conduct is within the proscription of the statute, his conviction is not vulnerable on vagueness
grounds, even if as applied to other
conduct, the law would be unconstitutionally vague. None of our cases
"suggests that one who has received
fair warning of the criminality of his
own conduct from the statute in
question is nonetheless entitled to
[461 US 370]

attack it because the language would
not give similar fair warning with
respect to other conduct which
might be within its broad and literal
ambit. One to whose conduct a statute clearly applies may not successfully challenge it for vagueness."
Parker v Levy, 417 US 733, 756, 41
L Ed 2d 439, 94 S a 2547 (1974).
The correlative rule is that a criminal statute is not unconstitutionally
vague on its face unless it is "impertioned in Terry, including either arrest or the
need to answer questions that the individual

missibly vague in all of its applications." Hoffman Estates v Flipside,
Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 US 489,
497, 71 L Ed 2d 362, 102 S Ct 1186
(1982).
These general rules are equally
applicable to cases where First
Amendment or other "fundamental"
interests are involved. The Court has
held that in such circumstances
"more precision in drafting may be
required because of the vagueness
doctrine in the case of regulation of
expression," Parker v Levy, 417 US,
at 756, 41 L Ed 2d 439, 94 S a 2547;
a "greater degree of specificity" is
demanded than in other contexts.
Smith v Goguen, 415 US 566, 573, 39
L Ed 2d 605, 94 S Ct 1242 (1974).
But the difference in such cases "relates to how strict a test of vagueness shall be applied in judging a
particular criminal statute." Parker
v Levy, supra, at 756, 41 L Ed 2d
439, 94 S Ct 2547. It does not permit
the challenger of the statute to confuse vagueness and overbreadth by
attacking the enactment as being
vague as applied to conduct other
than his own. See ibid. Of course, if
his own actions are themselves protected by the First Amendment or
other constitutional provision, or if
the statute does not fairly warn that
it is proscribed, he may not be convicted. But it would be unavailing
for him to claim that although he
knew his own conduct was unprotected and was plainly enough forbidden by the statute, others may be
in doubt as to whether their acts are
banned by the law.
The upshot of our cases, therefore,
is that whether or not a statute
purports to regulate constitutionally
does not want to answer in order to avoid
arrest or end a detention.
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Reported p 99, supra

vent its transference as "harmless error" or by psychological
effect, in spite of instructions for
keeping separate transactions
separate.
§ 11. Manner or means of committing offense
In the following cases, the Supreme Court held that there was no
material variance where the evidence did not establish all the allegations in the indictment relating to
the manner or means of committing
the offense, the court pointing out
that it was sufficient to sustain a
conviction if the evidence showed
that the' offense charged was committed in one of the ways alleged in
the indictment.
Affirming a conviction for a violation of a statute proscribing interstate transportation of a woman for
immoral purposes, the court, in Bennett v United States (1913) 227 US
333, 57 L Ed 531, 33 S a 288, held
that proof establishing the transportation of one woman, contrary to the
statute, instead of two, as charged in
the indictment, did not constitute a
fatal variance. The court said that
this was a contention which had
more of technicality than substance.
Reversing the judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals
which had reversed a judgment of
conviction of defendants for engaging in a combination and conspiracy
to restrain interstate trade and commerce contrary to the Sherman Act,
the Supreme Court, in United States
v Brims (1926) 272 US 549, 71 L Ed
403, 47 S a 169, disagreed with the
Court of Appeals that there was a
fatal variance between the indictment and the evidence, where the
indictment charged the defendants
with combining or conspiring to prevent manufacturing plants located
outside the city of Chicago and other
888

states than Illinois from selling and
delivering their building material in
and shipping it to Chicago, and
where the proof disclosed merely an
agreement between the defendants
whereby the union defendants were
not to work upon nonunion-made
millwork, whether produced in or
out of Illinois. According to the Supreme Court, the allegations of the
indictment were sufficient to cover a
combination like the one which
some of the evidence tended to show,
and it was a matter of no consequence that the purpose was to shut
out nonunion millwork made within
Illinois as well as that made without. The Supreme Court pointed out
that the crime of restraining interstate commerce through combination was not condoned by the inclusion of intrastate commerce as well.
In United States v Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co. (1940) 310 US 150, 84 L Ed
1129, 60 S Ct 811, the court said
that a variation between the means
charged in an indictment to have
been employed by members of an
alleged conspiracy in restraint of
trade in violation of the Sherman
Act and the means shown by the
proof to have been utilized was not
fatal. Affirming the convictions in a
United States District Court, the Supreme Court held that an indictment under the Act charging certain
oil companies with combining and
conspiring together for the purpose
of artificially raising and fixing the
spot market tank car price of gasoline, and with having done so by
participating in buying programs for
the purchase of gasoline from independent refiners, pursuant to allotments among themselves, at uniformly high and at times progressively increasing prices, and alleging
that certain trade journals were
"the chief agencies and instrumentalities" through which the illegally

1372 Utah

786 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

as previously is a question of fact,5 and the
lienors have not marshalled evidence to
demonstrate that the district court's finding on this question is clearly erroneous.

Harris, J., of disorderly conduct and he
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Jackson,
J., held that disorderly conduct statute proscribing obscene or abusive language spoken with intent "to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, or recklessly
creating a risk thereof" was unconstitutionally overbroad.
Reversed.

Attorney Fees
[5] The district court awarded attorney
fees to Deseret Federal, an award which is
not questioned on appeal, and Deseret Federal seeks a similar award of the fees it
incurred on appeal. Utah Code Ann.
§ 38-1-18 (1988) enables a court to award 1. Municipal Corporations <$=>594(2)
attorney fees to the successful party in a
Municipal disorderly conduct ordinance
case brought to enforce a mechanic's lien. proscribing obscene or abusive language
Cases interpreting that statute have con- spoken with intent "to cause public inconstrued it narrowly; however, the complaint venience, annoyance, or alarm, or recklessin this case makes clear that this is a suit ly creating a risk thereof" was unconstitu"to enforce a lien,"6 because it seeks not
tionally overbroad, insofar as it punished a
merely a priority determination but also an
order of foreclosure and a sheriff's sale significant amount of protected verbal exunder the lien. Deseret Federal is there- pression, including criticism and challenge,
fore awarded attorney fees reasonable in vulgarities and remonstrations, whether it
amount for services rendered in the appeal was directed at police officer, ordinary citizen, or one who was not even present,
of this case.
without regard to its likely impact on any
The judgment of the district court is actual addressee. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend.
affirmed, and the case reasonably is re- 1.
manded for determination of the amount of
attorney fees reasonably incurred on ap- 2. Municipal Corporations <s=>594(2)
peal.
Court would not construe the term
"abusive language" in unconstitutionally
GREENWOOD and JACKSON, JJ.,
overbroad disorderly conduct ordinance to
concur.
encompass only fighting words; it was municipality's job, not court's, to fashion narrowly drawn ordinance criminalizing unprotected speech. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 1.

LOGAN CITY, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
Ralph Lowell HUBER, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 890093-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Jan. 17, 1^90.

A.W. Lauritzen, Logan City, for defendant and appellant.
Cheryl A. Russell, Logan City, for plaintiff-respondent.
Before DAVIDSON, GARFF and
JACKSON, JJ.
OPINION

Defendant was convicted, in the First
Circuit Court, Cache County, Burton H.

JACKSON, Judge:
Ralph Lowell Huber was convicted by a
jury of disorderly conduct, a misdemeanor,

5. Duckett, 699 P.2d at 736; Boise Cascade Corp.
v. Stephens, 572 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1977).

6. See Rotta v. Hawk, 756 P.2d 713, 716 (Utah
App.1988).
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in violation of a Logan City ordinance. On
appeal, he challenges the constitutionality
of the ordinance on its face and as applied.
We reverse.
In the early morning hours of December
11, 1988, Officers Russell Roper and Greg
Monroe were on alcohol enforcement detail.
They were parked off the road in their
unmarked patrol car when they heard and
saw a small car approaching them. The
car made a wide turn at the corner and
started to slide on the pea gravel in the
road. The car accelerated and went past
the police vehicle, at a speed estimated by
the officers at 35-38 m.p.h. in a 25 m.p.h.
zone, then braked to a stop at a red light on
Main Street and Third North in Logan City,
Utah. Officer Roper followed and pulled
up behind the car at the light.

was using unspecified "hand actions," and
he stepped closer to Roper, talking directly
in his face. After Roper again explained to
Huber that they had observed him speeding, Monroe took over the conversation.
Although Monroe testified that he intervened because he thought there was going
to be a fight, he testified to no acts other
than the use of these words in a loud voice
and Huber's proximity to Roper at this
point. Roper explained that, once his partner stepped in and took over the conversation with Huber, he simply backed away
and returned to the patrol car to summon
assistance. He then rejoined Monroe at
the front of Huber's car at some point
after Huber had turned over his driver's
license to Monroe.

When the semaphore turned green and
the small car proceeded through the intersection, Officer Roper turned on his red
spotlight and followed the small car as it
turned in to the parking lot of defendant
Huber's business. As the officers alighted,
Huber got out of his car and walked briskly up to the door of his building. Officer
Monroe called to Huber and said they
wanted to talk to him. In an exchange of
words lasting approximately two to three
minutes, Roper first asked Huber how he
was, and Huber turned to face the officers,
who were three to four feet away. He told
the police they were trespassing on his
property, took a step closer and said, "Now
git," and pointed in the direction they
should go. Roper then asked Huber for his
driver's license. Huber refused, saying,
"Fuck you, I'm not going to give it to you."
The request was repeated several times
and Huber continued to refuse, variously
responding, "Fuck you," "This is bullshit,"
"You know who I am," and "You guys are
harassing me, you piss me right off." During this time, Huber's voice was raised, he

The following two- to three-minute exchange took place next between Monroe
and Huber, immediately preceding Huber's
arrest,1 as captured on Monroe's tape recorder (all ellipses appear in the transcript
admitted into evidence):
Huber: ... You're two blocks down the
road.
Monroe: We weren't two blocks down
the road.
Huber: You were clear the hell down by
Taco Time.
Monroe: Do you want to know where we
really were? When you came around the
corner, when you came around the corner awfully fast, right at the road here,
we were parked just off the road. But
we do need to see your driver's license.
Huber: ... This is my property and
you're on it without my permission, and
that's it that's what it boils down to. If
it
I'm tired of being harrassed.
Monroe: We need to see your registration too please.12!
Huber: Bullshit! Now look you're on
my property this is my building, I ha-

1. Monroe estimated the total elapsed time from
the point at which the officers pulled in behind
Huber's car in the business parking lot and the
point at which he was arrested at approximately
five to six minutes.

2. At trial, Monroe clarified that Huber had
turned over his driver's license at this point,
even though the officer's next line in the recorded conversation makes it seem that Huber had
not yet done so.

U.S. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
intermediate gang minimum status.
App 147. This change was designed
to redress problems that had arisen
when inmates were transferred directly from the restrictive maximum
security status to full minimum status, with its markedly higher level
of freedom. Because of serious overcrowding in the main building, Standard 853 further mandated that
gang minimum inmates ordinarily
be assigned jobs outside the main
building. Ibid. These inmates work
in details of 8 to 15 persons, supervised by one guard.
[482 US 346]

Standard 853
also required that full minimum inmates work outside the main institution, whether on or off prison
grounds, or in a satellite building
such as the Farm. Ibid.
Corrections officials at Leesburg
implemented these policies gradually and, as the District Court noted,
with some difficulty. 595 F Supp 928,
929 (NJ 1984). In the initial stages of
outside work details for gang minimum prisoners, officials apparently
allowed some Muslim inmates to
work inside the main building on
Fridays so that they could attend
Jumu'ah. This alternative was eventually eliminated in March 1984, in
light of the directive of Standard 853
that all gang minimum inmates
work outside the main building.
Significant problems arose with
those inmates assigned to outside
work details. Some avoided reporting
for their assignments, while others
found reasons for returning to the
main building during the course of
the workday (including their desire
to attend religious services). Evidence showed that the return of
prisoners during the day resulted in
security risks and administrative
burdens that prison officials found
288

96 L Ed 2d

unacceptable. Because details of inmates were supervised by only one
guard, the whole detail was forced to
return to the main gate when one
prisoner desired to return to the
facility. The gate was the site of all
incoming foot and vehicle traffic during the day, and prison officials
viewed it as a high security risk
area. When an inmate returned, vehicle traffic was delayed while the
inmate was logged in and searched.
In response to these burdens, Leesburg officials took steps to ensure
that those assigned to outside details
remained there for the whole day.
Thus, arrangements were made to
have lunch and required medications
brought out to the prisoners, and
appointments with doctors and social workers were scheduled for the
late afternoon. These c h a n g e s
proved insufficient, however, and
prison officials began to study alternatives. After consulting with the
director of social services, the director of professional services, and the
1482 US 347]

prison's imam and chaplain, prison
officials in March 1984 issued a policy memorandum which prohibited
inmates assigned to outside work
details from returning to the prison
during the day except in the case of
emergency.
The prohibition of returns prevented Muslims assigned to outside
work details from attending Jumu'ah. Respondents filed suit under
42 USC §1983 [42 USCS §1983],
alleging that the prison policies unconstitutionally denied them their
Free Exercise rights under the First
Amendment, as applied to the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court, applying
the standards announced in an earlier decision of the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit, concluded that
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al court rejected the request that it instruct
on negligent homicide.6
f6] In State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152,
154-59 (Utah 1983), we set out a twopronged test for determining when lesser
included offense instructions must be given. As applied to this case, the Baker test
would require a showing that (i) the statutory elements of the two offenses are related, and (ii) the evidence provides a reasonable basis for a finding of not guilty of
second degree murder and guilty of negligent homicide. We conclude that even if it
was error for the trial court not to instruct
the jury on negligent homicide, a question
we do not decide, the error was harmless.
The jury had the opportunity to find that
Gotschall acted with a lesser mental state
than that required for second degree murder when it was given a manslaughter instruction, yet it convicted Gotschall of second degree murder. Gotschall's counsel
does not suggest how, in light of this fact,
there is any reasonable likelihood that if an
instruction on negligent homicide had been
given, the jury would have convicted Gotschall of that offense, rather than second
degree murder or manslaughter. Therefore, the failure to give the instructions
was harmless error. Utah R.Evid. 103;
Utah R.Crim.P. 30 (codified at Utah Code
Ann. §§ 77-35-30 (1982) (repealed effective
July 1. 1990); see State v. Rimmasch, 775
P.2d 388, 407 (Utah 1989); State v. Knight
734 P.2d 913, 919-20 (Utah 1987); Verde,
770 P.2d at 120.
For the foregoing reasons, Gotschall's
conviction is affirmed.
HALL, C.J., HOWE. Associate C.J.,
DURHAM, J., and BILLINGS, Court
of Appeals Judge, concur.
(2) Manslaughter is a felony of the second
degree.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (Supp.1989).
6. Section 75-5-206 of the Code provides as follows:
Negligent homicide.

MOUNTAIN STATES TE1L & TEL. CO. v. PAYNE

STEWART, J., does not participate
herein; BILLINGS, Court of Appeals
Judge, sat.

(o

| KEY NUMBER SYSTEM>

MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE
AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY.
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Jill M. PAYNE and Terry J.
Stephenson, Defendants and
Appellant.
No. 860268.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Oct. 16, 1989.
Payee brought suit against secretary
who signed checks drawn on insufficient
funds. The Third District Court. Salt Lake
County, Scott Daniels, J., held secretary
liable, and she appealed. The Supreme
Court, Durham, J., held that signator of
bad check could not be held personally liable where she did not receive benefits or
have actual knowledge that check was
drawn on insufficient funds.
Reversed.
Howe, J., concurred in result.

1. Bills and Notes e=> 123(2)
Signator of bad check could not be held
personally liable where she did not receive
benefits, services, or money transfers, or
have actual knowledge that check she
signed in her capacity as secretary/bookkeeper was drawn on insufficient corporate
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes negligent
homicide if the actor, acting with criminal
negligence, causes the death of another.
(2) Negligent homicide is a class A misdemeanor.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-206 (1978).
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funds.
U.C.A.1953, 7-15-1, 70A-1-104,
70A-3-403, 70A-3-403(2)(b).
2. Constitutional Law <3=»48(1)
If there are alternative statutory constructions possible, one rendering statute
constitutional and the other unconstitutional, the former should be adopted. U.C.A.
1953, 7-15-1, 70A-1-104, 70A-3-403, 70A3-403(2)(b).
James F. Housley, Salt Lake City, for
Payne.
Floyd A. Jensen, Salt Lake City, for
Mountain States Tel. and Tel. Co.
DURHAM, Justice:
Appellant Jill M. Payne contends that the
trial court committed reversible error in
finding her liable for writing checks drawn
on insufficient funds pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 7-15-1 (1988).1 We reverse.
Appellant was employed as a secretary/bookkeeper for NAMCO Corporation
from 1981 to 1982. As part of her assigned duties, appellant, an authorized signatory, prepared and signed checks drawn
upon the corporate accounts in payment of
corporate obligations at the direction of
corporate officers. She had no interest,
beneficial or otherwise, in the checking account, the funds in the checking account, or
the corporation.
A number of checks written to Mountain
States Telephone and Telegraph Co. (Mountain States) for services received by NAMCO and signed by appellant were drawn on
insufficient funds. As a result. Mountain
States brought suit against appellant and
her boss, defendant Terry J. Stephenson,
for liability under Utah Code Ann.
§ 7-15-1. Both defendants were properly
served. Stephenson failed to appear or
answer, and judgment by default was entered against him on December 9, 1982.
Appellant wrote a timely letter to plaintiffs counsel, referring to the summons
and explaining that she was a mere employee and had signed the checks at Stephenson's direction. No further action was
1. The current version of the statute reflects mi-

taken regarding the claim against appellant
until approximately thirty-nine months later, when Mountain States filed a motion
for judgment on the pleadings or, in the
alternative, for summary judgment, contending that appellant answered the complaint but did not deny liability for the
debt. The trial court entered an order
granting plaintiffs motion for judgment
after a hearing in which appellant appeared
pro se. Judgment for $2,896.76 was entered on April 8, 1986.
Appellant thereafter arranged for pro
bono counsel. Appellant's attorney filed
alternative motions for relief from order,
amendment of judgment, new trial, judgment n.o.v., and findings of fact and conclusions of law. After a hearing on appellant's alternative motions, the trial judge
denied them, concluding that Utah Code
Ann. § 7-15-1 imposed strict liability on
appellant. The trial judge subsequently
signed an order granting plaintiffs motion
for judgment on the pleadings. The trial
judge declined to enter findings of fact or
conclusions of law.
Appellant argues that the trial court
committed reversible error in construing
section 7-15-1 as imposing strict liability
on her for signing corporate checks on
behalf of her employer in payment for corporate obligations. Appellant also argues
that construing section 7-15-1 to impose
strict liability renders the statute unconstitutional under the due process provision of
the fourteenth amendment of the United
States Constitution and article I, section 7
of the Utah Constitution. We address the
strict liability issue first.
The statute at issue. Utah Code Ann.
§ 7-15-1 (1988), states in pertinent part:
(1) Any person who makes, draws,
signs or issues any check, draft, order or
other instrument upon any depository institution, whether as corporate agent or
otherwise, for the purpose of obtaining
from any person, firm, partnership, or
corporation any money, merchandise,
property, or other thing of value or paying for any service, wages, salary or
rent, shall be liable to the holder of the
nor grammatical changes made in 1986.
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always been an integral element in Colora
do's bad check law The reason for chang
ing this intent to a reasonable cause to
know that the check will not be paid when
presented for payment is obscure Surmise
and conjecture would lead us to the view
that the apparent intent of the General As
sembly was to enable the district attorneys
to facilitate prosecutions and obtain convictions more readily in bad check cases
We might also suspect that the present
statute was designed to facilitate collections on both bad checks and debts We
were told on oral argument by the district
attorney that the gravamen of the statute
is to prevent worthless paper from entering the flow of commercial transactions,
the resulting effect being to increase the
reliability of commercial paper It is also
possible that the new law was aimed at
some sort of conformity with the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code
with respect to practices of banks and
banking
Whatever reasons prompted the enactment of the present bad check statute, we
are compelled to state that it is utterly
lacking in the essential elements which ascribe validity and legal sufficiency to any
enforceable criminal statute It is of significance to note also that we have not
been directed to any bad check statute of
any other state, nor have we been able to
discover any jurisdiction which has a statute similar to the Colorado statute
The trial court found the statute unconstitutional and void because of vagueness,
uncertainty, indefiniteness, ambiguity, and
unintelligibihty
It also found that, in
some instances, the statute presumes guilt,
that, in some instances, it is selective in
prosecution, that the bank involved has
the power to decide whether a party is a
criminal or a favored customer, and finally, that the statute is a collection statute
and imposes imprisonment for debt We
agree with the trial court that these inf i r m i t y are oresent in this statute.

With these general observations in mind,
we turn to an examination of the particular deficiencies in this statute
II
[1,2] The district attorney on behalf of
the People asserts that it was error for the
trial court to hold the entire statute unconstitutional, and argues that even if certain
portions of the Act are unconstitutional,
the general severability clause of C R S
1963, 135-1-5 would save the rest of the
statute The trial judge ruled that since
the enacting clause did not contain a severability section, the entire Act must fall.
We agree with the district attorney that
C R S 1963, 135-1-5 would save those portions of the Act not found to be unconstitutional as this general severability clause
is applicable to any legislative act not containing a specific severability provision
However, the final portion of C R S 1963,
135-1-5 declares, in effect, that if those
unexcised portions of an Act are incomplete and are incapable of being executed
in accordance with the legislative intent,
the entire Act is void As will be noted
hereinafter, the skeleton of Section 4014-20 which remains after striking out the
invalid provisions, fails to describe any offense Therefore, the trial court properly
declared the entire statute unconstitutional
III
[3,4] We hold that the definition of
"insufficient funds" in Section 40-14-20(1)
(h) is vague, ambiguous, and unintelligible
That section defines insufficient funds to
mean "that the drawer has no legal right
to require the drawee to pay the check in
accordance with the ordinary course of the
banking business " An interesting contrast
to this definition is that contained in the
amended version of the vetoed 1969 H B
1087 which defined "insufficient funds" as
follows
"A drawer has insufficient funds with a
drawee to cover a check when he has no
funds or account whatever, or funds in

an amount less than that of the check,
and a check dishonored for 'no account'
shall also be deemed to have been dis
honored for 'insufficient funds ' "
The above quoted definition spells out an
understandable meaning of "insufficient
funds" while the 1970 Act leaves the mean
ing to surmise and conjecture
Criminal
liability cannot be predicated on such a
standard
What is meant by "legal
right ? " Does it refer to legal rights as
determined by the provisions of Article 4
of the Uniform Commercial Code, C R S
1963, 155-4-101 et seq?, does it mean
contractual rights between the drawer and
the drawee ? , or, does it refer to legal
rights created by the provisions of the
criminal law? Also, where does one look
to determine what accords with "the ordinary course of the banking business ? " Is
it to the Uniform Commercial Code, to
some other statute, or to the customs and
practices of the banking business itself?
This failure of the definition to clearly de
lineate an understandable meaning to the
term "insufficient funds," renders this portion of the statute invalid as being vague,
indefinite, ambiguous, and unintelligible
IV
[5,6] Next, we find that the lack of
any requirement in Section 40-14-20 that
there be an intent to defraud coupled with
a presumption of guilt provided in Subdivision (5) (a) (i) woulvl, under certain cir
cumstances, render Section 40-14-20 to be
no more than a device to force payment of
debt It is quite conceivable that a person
could issue a check without "knowing or
having reasonable cause to know" that it
will not be paid when presented as required in Subdivision (2) (b) Thereafter,
if the check is for some reason not paid
when presented, and if the maker is unable
to redeem his check within fifteen days (see
Subdivision (6) (b)), a presumption arises
which shifts the burden on to the defend
ant to disprove his guilt Such a result
strikes at the very foundation of our sys*-.- ~r „, ^ „Qi ,iictir#» a* was recognized

by this court in Moore v People, supra It
is elementary that the burden of proving
every element of a criminal charge is upon
the prosecution Under Section 40-14-20,
the People need only introduce the check,
show it was not paid, and rest The defendant is then placed in a position of
being required to prove his innocence in
order to avoid imprisonment not for a
criminal act, but for debt This is so because without fraudulent intent as an element in this type of offense, there can be
no crime In this respect, Section 40-1420 can be interpreted as nothing more than
a collection statute which authorizes imprisonment for debt As such, it is in contravention of Colo Const art II, § 12
See, also Burnam v Commonwealth, 228
Ky 410, 15 S W 2 d 256, which uses the
following language to describe a statute
which was, in some respects, similar in
content to Section 40-14-20
"The act
is a debt collecting law
To that end it undertakes to invoke
criminal processes and to inflict penalties
which in their seventy may be on occasion disproportionate to the seriousness
of the offense endeavored to be created
and the evil sought to be cured The essential and controlling difference between the act and other statutes of this
kind, .
is that the element of
fraud or other criminal purpose is not an
ingredient"
[7] In addition, under the various provisions of Section 40-14-20, the action of a
third party, the bank, can often be the factor which determines whether guilt attaches
If two customers each write a
check knowing it will not be paid on
presentment due to insufficiency of funds
in their respective accounts, each should be
theoretically guilty of a crime Yet, the
bank upon which the check is drawn has
the discretion to dishonor one and pay the
other Such a discretion is at odds with
constitutional due process and equal protection of the laws Criminal liability and
punishments should not be predicated upon
a third party's unfettered discretion
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tracted for the construction of an apartment complex in Salt Lake County. BBC
subcontracted the plumbing work to Horace Lloyd, who purchased plumbing materials from PPS commencing in June 1983 to
August 1984. Lloyd failed to pay PPS for
all of the materials furnished for the construction project.
On December 31, 1984, Bowers sold the
project to Regency Apartments, Ltd. (Regency). Bernson, Terry, and Babcock were
general partners in Vescor Financial
Group, which was the general partner of
Regency. Bernson was the only limited
partner in Regency.
On the same day that Regency purchased the project from Bowers, it sold the
project to Wilshire Utah I Ltd., which
failed to make payments to the first mortgage holder, American Savings and Loan,
as well as to Bowers and Regency. Wilshire eventually filed for bankruptcy and
American Savings foreclosed on the property.
Regency then entered into an arrangement with Bowers whereby Regency would
negotiate a settlement with the ten creditors of the project, including PPS, for
which Regency would receive credit
against the sum it owed to Bowers equal to
the full amount due each creditor. All of
the creditors except PPS negotiated a settlement with Regency.
PPS received a check from Regency dated May 15, 1985, in the amount of $13,750,
an arbitrary figure offered by Regency to
settle PPS's claim of approximately $19,000. The check contained a restrictive endorsement that PPS, by endorsing the
check, would be releasing any and all
claims it might have against Bowers
and/or the property. The endorsement
stated:
Endorsement hereby releases any claims
for further payments of any and all outstanding Invoices to either Bowers Construction, Eugene Bowers, Vescor Financial Group or any future assignee. In
consideration of this payment Peterson
Plumbing Supply and/or Don Peterson
agree that all payments concerning bills
for supplies and/or work done on the

Regency Apartments ... is paid in full
accordance [sic] satisfaction. Endorse^
ment also constitutes a full and complete,
waiver of any and all lien rights as pert
taining to the above mentioned properties and parties.
After receiving the check, Don Peterson,
PPS's owner, told Bernson and Babcock im
separate telephone calls that PPS was xum
willing to accept the amount offered by the
check. Peterson asked for more money,
but was told that no more would be of.
fered. A week later, Bernson again dis*
cussed the matter with Peterson, who
again rejected the offer. Bernson then
told Peterson that the offer was withdrawn
and asked Peterson to return the cheeky
Peterson failed to return the check. Funds
in the account upon which the check was
drawn were subsequently transferred to
another account
Six weeks later, PPS deposited the check.
The check did not clear when presented to
the bank for payment Subsequently, PPS
brought suit against appellees and Bowers.
The trial court entered judgment on a
quantum meruit theory against Bowers for
$5,246, a sum calculated by adding the
invoices produced at trial and deducting
certain credits. The trial court, however,
granted a directed verdict in favor of appellees dismissing PPS's action against them
based on a third party beneficiary theory
and on their alleged civil liability under
Utah's bad check statute, Utah Code Ann.
§ 7-15-1 (1982). PPS appeals the trial
court's directed verdict in favor of appellees on the bad check issue only.
[1] On appeal, PPS claims the trial
court erred in determining that the $13,750
check was not given for value under section 7-15-1. On review, we accord the trial
court's conclusions of law no particular deference, but review them for correctness.
Bountiful v. Riley, 784 P.2d 1174, 1175
(Utah 1989); Smith v. Smith, 793 P.2d 407,
409 (Utah CtApp.1990).
Section 7-15-1 states in pertinent part
(with our emphasis):
(1) Any person who makes, draws, signs
or issues any check, draft, order, or other
instrument upon any depository institu-
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tion, whether as corporate agent or otherwise, for the purpose of obtaining
from any person, firm, partnership or
corporation any money, merchandise,
property or other thing of value or paying for any service, wages, salary or
rent, which check, draft, order, or other
instrument is not honored upon presentment and is marked "refer to maker" or
the account with the depository upon
which the check, draft, order, or other
instrument has been made or drawn,
does not exist, has been closed or does
not have sufficient funds or sufficient
credit with such depository for payment
of the check, draft, or other instrument
in full, shall be liable to the holder thereof.
Tie Utah Supreme Court recently construed section 7-15-1 "to require that the
signator of a bad check personally receive
Benefits, services, or money transfer or, in
the alternative, have actual knowledge that
the check is drawn on insufficient funds in
Drder to be held liable." Mountain States
Tel & Tel. Co. v. Payne, 782 P.2d 464, 467
(Utah 1989).
[2] The trial court found that nothing
of value had been obtained by Regency
from PPS in exchange for the presentment
of the check. No goods were obtained
from PPS in exchange for the check; the
items of value, the plumbing materials,
were supplied earlier, on behalf of and at
the request of Bowers.
We reject PPS's contention that the trial
court erred in finding that the check was
not given for value under section 7-15-1.
Pivotal to our analysis is the fact that PPS
flatly rejected appellees' offer to enter into
an accord and satisfaction. PPS's belated
attempt to negotiate the check six weeks
after it had rejected Regency's offer and
subsequent withdrawal of the offer did not
constitute an acceptance. Having rejected
an offer, an offeree cannot revive it by
later tendering acceptance. Burton v.
Coombs, 557 P.2d 148, 149 (Utah 1976).
1. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505 (1990). PPS does
not provide any meaningful explanation for the

PPS first argues that the check constituted payment for an antecedent debt and
that the trial court mistakenly applied the
criminal bad check statute's alleged mandate that a check issued for payment of an
antecedent debt is not a "thing of value." !
PPS contends that section 7-15-1 should
instead be read in light of Utah Code Ann.
§§ 70A-3-303 and -403 (1980) of the Uniform Commercial Code, to support its position that a negotiable instrument is given
for value when given for payment of an
antecedent obligation.
We agree that where possible, section
7-15-1 should be construed to be consistent
with the Uniform Commercial Code. See
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 782 P.2d
at 467. In this case, however, we need not
determine whether the payment of an antecedent debt qualifies as a "thing of value"
under section 7-15-1 since, because PPS
rejected appellees' offer to enter into an
accord and satisfaction, the debt was never
satisfied. Further, PPS does not dispute
the trial court's finding that no other defendant, besides Bowers, contracted to pay
outstanding obligations of Bowers to materialmen on the project. Thus, even if the
debt were satisfied, since the debt was
Bowers', Regency would not have received
anything of value solely as a result of the
debt's satisfaction.
PPS next contends that the check was
given "for value" under section 7-15-1 in
that it purchased credit towards the contract between Regency and Bowers.
Again, we disagree. Because PPS rejected
appellees' offer, Regency did not obtain
any credit towards their contract with Bowers and thus did not receive anything of
value nor any benefit.
Finally, PPS asserts that the check was
given "for value" to release a potential
lien. However, because PPS failed to file a
lien within eighty days of supplying its last
materials in August 1984, it had no mechanic's lien rights to relinquish in May
hypothesized mandate.
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J O S E P H SMITH, Sheriff of Worcester County, Appellant,
v
VALAlilE COCUEN
415 US 56(i,39 L Ed 2d 605, 5)4 S Ct 1242
I No. 72-1254]
Argued November 12 and 13, 1973.

Decided March 25, 1974.

SUMMARY

The appellee, who wore a small cloth version of the United States Hag
sewn on the seat of his trousers, was convicted under a Massachusetts
s t a t u t e which imposed criminal liability on anyone who publicly " t r e a t s
contemptuously" the United States flag. Following the affirmance of his
conviction by the IVlashachusetIs Supreme Judicial Court (
Mass —,
279 NE2d ()(i(i), the appellee was ordered released on a writ of habeas
corpus by the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
on the ground t h a t the contempt portion of the Massachusetts statute was
impermissibly vague under the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment as well as overbroad under the First Amendment (343 F
Supp 161). The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed (471
F2d 8 8 ) .
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court affirmed. In an opinion
by P O W E L L , J., expressing the view of tive members of the court, it was
held t h a t the " t r e a t s contemptuously" portion of the statute was void for
vagueness under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
because the statutory provision did not adequately give notice of what
acts were criminal and did not set reasonable standards to guide law enforcement officers and juries.
J., concurring in the judgment, expressed the view that
although (he portion of the statute at issue was not unconstitutionally
vague, it was unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
WHITE,

B L A C K M U N , J., |oined by BuiujLR, Ch. J., dissenting, expressed the view
that the challenged part of the statute was neither unconstitutionally vague
nor was if violative* of the First Amendment since the Supreme Judicial

Uriels of Counsel, p I02<>, infra.
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sustain the denial of an award under the
accepted rule that affirmance will follow
such denial under such circumstances. The
rule is reflected in the several pronouncements of this Court in such cases as Martinez v. Board of Review, 25 Utah 2d 131,
477 P.2d 587 (1970), and decisions therein
cited.
The decision of the commission is affirmed.

( o I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
Michael Alfonso DELMOTTE,
Defendant and Appellant.
No. 18457.
Supreme Court of Utah.
June 14, 1983.
Defendant was convicted before the
Third District Court, Summit County, Homer F. Wilkinson, J., of writing bad checks,
and he appealed. The Supreme Court held
that: (1) issue of refusal to give requested
instruction was not preserved for review;
(2) record justified admission of bank statements showing overdrafts, which were sent
to defendant, to show commission ot offense charged, and probative effect of such
evidence outweighed any prejudicial effect;
and (3) intent to defraud was not element
of bad-check charge.
Affirmed.
Stewart, J., concurred in result.
1. False Pretenses «=>5
"Knowledge" of account's depletion is
material element in offense of writing bad
checks. U.C.A.1953, 76-6-505.
2. Criminal Law «==> 1038.2, 1038.3
Where, in prosecution for writing bad
checks, defendant made no objection, nor
did he except to refusal to give requested

instruction, issue was not before Supreme
Court on appeal. U.C.A.1953, 7&-6-505.
3. Criminal Law e=*432
Monthly bank statements showing
overdrafts, which were sent to defendant,
were admissible in prosecution for writing
bad checks to show "knowledge" of overdrafts, as integral and material part of offense charged.
U.C.A.1953, 76-6-505;
Rules of Evid., Rules 45, 55.
4. Criminal Law e=»432
In prosecution for writing bad checks,
record justified admission of monthly bank
statements showing overdrafts, which were
sent to defendant, to show commission of
offense charged, and probative effect outweighed any prejudicial effect.
U.C.A
1953, 76-6-505; Rules of Evid., Rules 45,
55.
5. False Pretenses <3=» 5
Intent to defraud is not element of
offense of writing bad checks.
6. False Pretenses o=»5
Element of "knowledge" of overdraft is
sufficient to support conviction of writing
bad checks. U.C.A.1953, 76-6-505.
Kenneth R. Brown, Salt Lake City, for
defendant and appellant.
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Robert N.
Parrish. Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and
respondent.
PER CURIAM;
This is an appeal from jury convictions
for writing bad checks in violation of
U.C.A., 1953, § 76-6-505. The subject
checks (three in number) were issued and
dishonored between August and November,
1980. The defendant, a landscaper in Parte
City, was placed on probation after having
been sentenced to the indeterminate term
provided by law.
The jury heard the following facts in
support of the verdict. From the latte*
months in 1978 through the early montfti w
1981, defendant had a checking a d f l w
with First Security Bank. He was told pfm.
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bank official that the bank would not continue to honor his bad checks. Defendant
was otherwise made aware of his overdrafts
by his receipt of monthly statements, which
were admitted in evidence over objection.
The defendant admitted writing the checks,
but testified he believed he had sufficient
funds in his account to cover them. He
claimed that at the time of the last and
largest check he is charged with writing
without sufficient funds, he had a third
person's check in his possession, which he
intended to deposit. The reason he did not
deposit the check was because he learned it
also would not be honored. Defendant conceded receiving the monthly statements
showing the overdraft status of his bank
account, and admitted that he knew he was
overdrawn at the time he wrote the third
check, with which he was charged in the
information. His testimony with respect to
that check was self-contradictory.

instructed the jury in instruction No. 5, as
being the reason for such admission in evidence. This Court, in a recent case, dispositively affirmed such admissibility in a ease
like this, 3 when it quoted the following language;
Any pertinent fact which throws light
upon . . . the accused's guilt or innocence
of the crime . . . charged, is admissible.
Such fact is not to be excluded merely
because it may also prove or tend to
prove . . . another similar crime. Relevant and material evidence does not become irrelevant or immaterial merely because it points to other offenses.
[4] We believe and hold that the record
justified admission of the bank statements
under Rule 55, to show commission of the
offense charged, and under Rule 45 because
the probative effect of such evidence outweighed any prejudicial effect.

[1,2] On appeal, defendant urges that
the trial court erred in refusing to give his
requested instruction No. 10. He contends
that one's belief that he has sufficient
funds in the bank is a defense to the
charge, and that he was entitled to have his
theory of the case presented to the jury. 1
"Knowledge" of the account's depletion is a
material element in the offense charged.
At trial, defendant admitted that he knew
his account was overdrawn when he issued
the third check. In any event, the defendant made no objection nor did he except :o
the court's refusal to give the instruction.
and consequently the issue is not now before us.2

[5,6] Defendant's final contention is
that the court erred in failing to instruct
that intent to defraud is a necessary element of a bad check charge. This claim of
error is without merit, since the offense
calls for no such element. Defendant argues that when the statutory language was
changed in 1977, the legislature intended to
retain the element as part of the offense.
The omission of the element in the revised
statute logically can mean nothing but that
the legislature's purpose deliberately was to
remove such intent as an element of the
offense. The element of "'knowledge" of
the overdraft is now sufficient to support a
conviction.
The verdicts and judgment are dffirmed.

[3] Defendant next contends that the
court abused its discretion in admitting the
monthly bank statements sent to defendant
showing overdrafts.
Defendant asserts
such abuse of discretion under Rules 45 and
55, Utah Rules of Evidence. Under Rule
55, the bank statements are admissible to
show "knowledge" of the overdrafts, an
integral and material part of the offense
charged. The trial court substantially so

STEWART, J., concurs in the result.

1. State v. Gillian, 23 Utah 2d 372, 463 P.2d 811 3. State v. Forsyth. Utah, 641 P.2d 1172 (1982).
(1970).
2. State v. Valdez, Utah, 604 P.2d 472 (1979);
State v. Pierren, Utah, 583 P.2d 69 (1978).
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hearing the case and addressing more fully
an issue of first impression Upon recon
sideration, we vacate our previous opinion
and set aside the trial court s judgment of
conviction and remand
Defendant was convicted of the crime of
unlawful sexual intercourse, a third degree
felony, under U C A , 1953, §76-5-401,
which provided !
(1) A person commits unlawful sexual
intercourse if that person has sexual in
tercourse with a person, not that per
son's spouse, who is under sixteen years
of age
(2) Unlawful sexual intercourse is a
felony of the third degree except when at
the time of intercourse the actor is no
more than three years older than the
victim, m which ease it is a class B misde
meanor Evidence that the actor was not
more than three years older than the
victim at the time of the intercourse shall
be raised by the defendant
On September 16, 1981, defendant engaged in sexual intercourse with a girl, not
his wife, who was fourteen jears of age
Defendant was nineteen years of age at the
time and therefore more than three years
older than the girl Defendant testified
that the girl told him she was eightteen
years of age and that he believed her repre
sentation The girl testified that she participated m the act voluntarily, but that she
told the defendant that she was fifteen
years old Although the trial court allowed
testimony showing that the defendant
knew the girl's age, the trial court excluded
any further testimony by the defendant
concerning the reasonableness of his belief
as to the girl's age and instructed the jury
that mistake as to the girl's age was no
defense to the charge
On this appeal, defendant argues that
the trial court erred m (1) excluding the
proffered evidence substantiating the basis
of the defendant's alleged belief that the
girl was over the a^ge of sixteen years and
1

The section has since been amended
Utah Laws ch 88 § 16

1983

(2) rejecting the defendant s requested jur\
instruction that a reasonable mistake as to
the girl s age constituted a defense to the
crime as charged We note that even if the
requested instruction had been given and
the jury had found in accordance therewith
the defendant still would have been guilt}
of fornication under Utah law UCA
1953, § 76-7-104
I
[1,2] The Utah Criminal Code follows
the common law in establishing the basic
proposition that a person cannot be found
guilty of a criminal offense unless he har
bors a requisite criminal state of mind or
unless the prohibited act is based on strict
liability At the time in question, § 76-2101 stated
No person is guilty of an offense un
less his conduct is prohibited by law and
(1) He acts intentionally, knowingly,
recklessly or with criminal negligence
with respect to each element of the of
fense as the definition of the offense
requires, or
(2) His acts constitute an offense in
volving strict liability2
Thus, for an act to constitute a crime, the
act must be prohibited and the defendant
must be shown to have possessed a culpa
ble or criminal state of mind, a mens rea,
"with respect to each element of the of
fense," unless the offense involves a strict
liability offense An established first pnn
ciple of the cnmmal law, with few excep
tions, is that the doing of a wrongful act
without the requisite culpable mental state
does not constitute a crime State v Blue,
17 Utah 175, 181, 53 P 978, 980 (1898)
Nor does the harboring of a criminal men
tal state, not translated into a prohibited
act constitute a crime
[3,4] Under the Utah Criminal Code, a
crime may be a strict liability crime only if
the statute specifically states it to be such 3
At the time m dispute, § 76-2-102 stated
2. The section has since been amended
Utah Laws ch 90 § 1 ch 98 § 1
3

1983

Strict criminal liability is clearly an exception

E\er\ offense not involving strict ha
biht\ shall require a culpable mental
state and when the definition of the of
fense does not specify a culpable mental
state intent, knowledge or recklessness
shall suffice to establish criminal respon
sibihty An offense shall involve strict
liability only when a statute defining
the offense clearly indicates a legisla
tive purpose to impose strict liability
for the conduct by use of the phrase
4i
stnct liability" or other terms of stmt
lar import [Emphasis added ] *
The unlawful sexual intercourse statute,
§ 76-5-401, supra, does not clearly indi
cate "a legislative purpose to impose strict
liability" as required by § 76-2-102 to es
tabhsh a stnct liability offense It does not
even impliedly indicate a legislative pur
pose to impose strict liability Thus, a
crime of unlawful sexual intercourse, a
crime different from the cnme of fornica
tion, cannot be proved unless the state
proves the requisite criminal state of mind
as to each element of the offense § 76-2101(1)
The elements of the degree of unlawful
sexual intercourse charged here are (1) an
act of sexual intercourse, (2) with a person,
not the defendant's spouse, (3) who is un
der sixteen years of age The punishment
is enhanced if the defendant is more than
three years older than the other person
§ 76-5-401(2) In proving unlawful sexual
intercourse, therefore, the state must prove
a culpable mental state bv showing that
the defendant °act[ed] intentionally, know
mgly, recklessly or with criminal negh
gence," § 76-2-101(1), as those terms are
defined m § 76-2-103
to long-established principles of criminal habih
ty Lnder Utah law strict liability exists onh
when the statute defining the offense expressly
so states. Generally strict criminal liability is
employed only in certain business or economic
regulations The United States Supreme Court
discussed the subject of strict liability in Moris
sette v United States 342 U S 246 72 S Ct 240
96 LEd 288 (1952) in which a defendants
conviction was overturned because no mens rea
was shown and the crime was not a regulatory
offense

Clearh the requisite culpable m«
state as to the first and second elemen
the offense is established b> showing
defendant intentionally engaged in se
intercourse with a female not his \
However since the crime of unlawful s
al intercourse is not a strict liability
fense, the critical issue is what rm
state must exist as to the victim's i
On its face, the unlawful sexual u
course statute does not require intent <
all elements of the cnme The mens
necessarv for the third element of
crime requires a consideration of the
poses of the statute No doubt one
pose of the statute is to deter persons 1
engaging in intercourse with young, in
ture persons and to avoid the conseq
risk of pregnancies because those sul
to the prohibitions of the statute,
males and females, are not likely tc
fully knowledgeable in any realistic
about the personal and social conseque
of an out-of wedlock pregnancy The
ute seeks to establish barriers around,
provide a measure of protection to, yoi
er, more impressionable, and perhaps n
persuadable persons m order to pre
them from engaging in sexual mtercoi
out of wedlock
[51 To accomplish those purposes
still remain true to long-established fu
mental principles of the cnminal law, w
have been incorporated in the Utah Ci
nal Code, we hold that as to the t
element of the crime, there must be p
of a culpable mental state which estab
es that the defendant was at least cnmi
ly negligent as to the age of the part
That is, the prosecution must prove
the defendant either was aware of the
4

This section has since been amended
Utah Laws ch 90 § 2

5

We shall refer to the girl in this case as
victim where helpful and for ease of r
ence although arguably this is a so called
timless crime Indeed both the girl and
defendant could have been charged with vi
ing § 76-3-401 The act prohibited is not
but a consensual act on the part of both par
However that may be the policy of law i
prevent persons from engaging in mterco
outside of marriage
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reversal; and David Robinson, Jr., filed a brief, pro se, as amicus curiae
urging reversal.
Robert Abrams, Attorney General of New York, Robert Hermann,
Solicitor General, Lawrence S. Kahn, Howard L. Zwickel, Charles R.
Fraser, and Sanford M. Cohen, Assistant Attorneys General, and John
Van de Kamp, Attorney General of California, filed briefs for the state of
New York et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance; Daniel D. Levenson,
David Cohen, and Frederick Mandel filed briefs for the American Jewish
Congress as amicus curiae urging affirmance; Margaret Farrell Ewing,
Donald N. Bersoff, Anne Simon, Nadine Taub, and Herbert Semmel
filed briefs for the American Psychological Association et al. as amici curiae
urging affirmance; Steven A. Rosen filed briefs for the Association of the
Bar of the city of New York as amicus curiae urging affirmance; John S. L.
Katz filed briefs for the National Organization of Women as amicus curiae
urging affirmance; and Jeffrey O. Bramlett filed briefs for the Presbyterian
Church (U. S. A.) et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance.
Mary C. Dunlap filed briefs for the Lesbian Rights Project et al. as amici
curiae; and Edward P. Errante, Leonard GrafT, and Jay Kohorn filed
briefs for the National Gay Rights Advocates et al. as amici curiae.

JAPAN WHALING ASSOCIATION and JAPAN FISHERIES
ASSOCIATION, Petitioners
v
AMERICAN CETACEAN SOCIETY et al. (No. 85-954)

MALCOLM BALDRIGE, Secretary of Commerce, et al., Petitioners
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Holding: Secretary of Commerce held not required to certify that Japan
had diminished effectiveness of whaling convention, where Japan agreed to
future limits and to cessation of commercial whaling.
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